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MECHANICS' LIENS AND SURETY BONDS IN THE
BUILDING TRADES
LIENS peculiar to the building industry were established by early American
legislation which has persisted, practically unchanged, to the present. Known
as mechanics' liens,' they derive from statutes drafted in an age when the
typical construction project was completed by the craftsmen of a single em-
ployer.2 Today, courts must apply these statutes to a radically altered industry.
While some minor construction work is still performed by contractors who
hire their own laborers and personally obtain the necessary materials, virtually
all important building is now carried on by general contractors who utilize
subcontractors to do a substantial part of the work. 3 The development of build-
ing techniques involving a high degree of specialization has necessitated the
employment of subcontractors, for the organization is rare which has at its
disposal all the equipment, manpower and know-how required to complete a
project of any appreciable size.
Under the subcontracting system, the owner who desires an improvement
requests bids from general contractors after supplying them with plans and
specifications on which to base their estimates. Once selected, the winning
bidder subcontracts most of the work to other contractors with whom he has
ordinarily conferred during the preparation of his estimate, and from whom
he may have a contingent agreement or informal promise to perform at a
given price.4 Subcontractors may in turn enter into agreements with suppliers
of labor and materials or with still other subcontractors.
Undocumented material in this Comment was obtained through correspondence and
discussion with people in the building trades and surety business.
1. The statutory mechanic's lien applies only to the construction industry. The lien
is akin to that given by the common law to artisans upon materials in their possession
for labor bestowed on them, and is a favored lien both in law and equity. See 2 KENT,
COMMENTARIES 634 (12th ed. 1873); PHLLIPS, MECHANICS' LIENs 16 (1883).
2. See note 12 infra.
3. The procedure whereby one contractor supplies all materials and services, known
as "force-account" contracting, is now used primarily in building low-cost residences. A
survey based on 1947 conditions revealed that only 15% of private residential building was
being done by force-account contractors. Percentage figures for other significant areas
were: private industrial 15%, private commercial 5%, public residential 0%, public
nonresidential 5%, and military and naval 15%. COLEAN-NEwcomB, STABILIZING CON-
STRucrIoN 249 (1952). For a critical discussion of the problems posed by the lien laws
in the small-project area, see Stalling, The Need for Special, Simplified Mechanics" Lien
Acts Applicable to Home Construction, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 592 (1938) ; COUNCIL
OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION PROGRA- FOR 1957, 101 (1957).
This Comment does not treat separately problems arising on jobs where the owner
himself hires all laborers and purchases all materials. Such problems are substantially
similar to those here discussed.
4. A contingent contract is referred to as a "tie-up" at the time of bidding. For a
general discussion of the organization of the construction industry, see COLEAN-NEWCO.Mi,
STABILIZING CONSTRUCTION 90 (1952).
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Because a general contractor or subcontractor must quote his prices in ad-
vance and then attempt to perform accordingly, he may be forced by rising
costs or unforseen difficulties to operate with insufficient capital. As a result,
contractors are extremely sensitive to a wide variety of market and seasonal
fluctuations and to risks which are beyond their control. Like the producer of
any other expensive, durable goods whose purchase can be postponed, the
construction industry is unable to anticipate its future volume of business with
any degree of certainty.5 In spite of technological advances, the cost of working
in bad weather is still high and the volume of construction activity diminishes
markedly during the winter, thus superimposing seasonal trends on the normal
year-to-year instability of the industry.6 Furthermore, radical changes in the
prices of materials may occur between the time that the general contractor sub-
mits his bid and the time when he must perform.7 To avoid the costly immobili-
zation of heavy equipment and large labor forces, building materials must be
on hand exactly when required.8 Delivery is often uncertain, however, and
the materials are bulky and expensive to store. Workmen may leave a half-
completed project to sell their services in a better market, or they may be pulled
off the job during the course of a jurisdictional dispute or other union disturb-
ance.9 Employment is seasonal, and the daily productivity of a workman is
unpredictable. Death or the disability of key men in the contractor's organi-
5. For a vivid graphic illustration of the close relationship between the amount of new
construction and the volume of durable goods produced, see COLEMAN-NEWComB, STABlIZ-
iNc CoNsTRucroN 18-19 (1952).
6. For a discussion of weather problems in the building trades, see Comi~rITT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON UNEMPLOYMENT, SEASONAL OPERATION IN THE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRIES (1924). Of course, many techniques for mitigating the effects of bad weather
have been developed since this report was compiled, but the general picture remains
essentially the same.
7. These changes are reflected in the monthly tabulations of journals such as Construc-
tion Review, Engineering News Record, and Building Trade News. While labor prices
have maintained a steady upward movement, prices of such essential materials as lumber,
sheet metal, cement and paint fluctuate with great irregularity.
8. The high cost of an immobilized construction force can best be appreciated by refer-
ence to the hourly rates of a few of the more important trades. As of December 1957, brick-
layers averaged $3.865 per hour, carpenters $3.341, structural iron workers $3.624, con-
struction machinery operators (tractors, power cranes, shovels, etc.) $3.248. Engineering
News Record, Feb. 13, 1958.
9. Disruptive union practices are widespread in the construction industry, and juris-
dictional disputes still occur frequently though forbidden by statute. See § 8(b) (4) of
the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1952). Disputes be-
tween the Chauffers and Teamsters Unions over whose men should drive what vehicles
still cause serious delays. The Lathers and Plasterers Union's running feud with the Car-
penters over who shall install acoustical ceiling tile has held up countless projects. The
construction of a school in Great Neck, N.Y., was tied up for months while the Carpenters
and the Laborers squabbled over which union was to unload lumber from incoming trucks.
Faced with the possiblity of costly delays, job superintendents not infrequently find that
the quickest way to resume work is through giving one union delegate something to ease
his humiliation in having to yield to the rival union. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Special
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
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zation, a destructive fire or some other on-the-job loss inadequately covered
by insurance, bad credit judgment, dishonesty on the part of the contractor's
employees, accidents and default on the part of subcontractors-all these add
to the hazards of the industry.
In times of prosperity, the number of business failures tends to decrease as
credit is made available for larger and more numerous projects.'" On the other
hand, an excess of credit in good times often induces contractors to undertake
more work than is justified by the amount of capital at their disposal.'1 Hence,
a contractor may find himself entangled in long-term projects which do not
yield the quick return of capital necessary for meeting his obligations. If a
business recession should then decrease the availability of credit and increase
the likelihood of subcontractor default, the contractor may be unable to dis-
charge his obligations and forced to abandon one or more projects. Further-
more, when a general contractor faces economic hardship, a subcontractor ma-
prefer to default rather than to continue performance and risk nonpayment.
Thus, the ability of a contractor or subcontractor to obtain interim financing
can decide not only his own survival but also that of others in the subcontractual
chain.
The subcontractor's financial position is inherently one of dependence, since
his receipt of payment is tied to the successful performance of all those above
him and, to some extent, of those below him as well. 12 Conceptually, and in
the absence of statute, once a general contractor defaults, an unpaid sub-
contractor might be able to recover from the owner in quantum meruit for
the price of materials and labor supplied. 13 Nonetheless, the costs of and delays
in pursuing such a remedy would render it impractical; and, of course, legal
fees would diminish, and the owner's insolvency could frustrate, any recovery.
Moreover, until the subcontractor had successfully litigated his claim, he would
often lack sufficient capital to carry on his business.
vol. 1 (1947) (Northern New Jersey Jurisdictional Disputes in the A.F. of L. Building
Trades); HABER & LEvINsox, LABOR RELATIONS AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE BUILDING
TRADES 178, 230 (1956).
10. A comparison of failures over a period of years with loan prices and general
business indexes establishes this fact beyond doubt. The number of business failures shows
a definite correlation with the interest rate and with the general price level. See Engineer-
ing News Record, Feb. 13, 1958; U.S. STATISTICAL ABSTAcr 498 (1958).
11. See BACKMAN, SURTY RATE-MAKING 248 (1948) (graph of construction and
surety activity) ; id. at 260 (graph of losses and current liabilities in business failures) ;
U.S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 498 (1957) (table of failures of construction groups) ; id. at
499 (table of industrial and commercial failures; table of percent of contracting firms
surviving to specified age).
12. The elements of a construction project interlock like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle.
If one trade does its work improperly or fails to complete on schedule, all the trades follow-
ing it will be held up, and costly repair and replacement work may be required. For ex-
ample, failure to install plumbing or wiring properly may require whole walls and floors
to be ripped out after a project is finished.
13. But cf. Sweeting v. Asplin, 7 M. & W. 165, 151 Eng. Rep. 723 (Ex. 1840);
Leslie & Co. v. Metropolitan Asylums Dist., 1 Local Gov't R. 862 (C.A. 1901).
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Resort to quantum meruit has never been attempted, however, because the
legislatures have provided a surer and speedier, if not exclusive, method of
recovery in the form of the mechanic's lien. 14 Although the product of an era
in which subcontracting was uncommon and therefore originally intended to
protect the prime contracting party, the mechanic's lien today serves principally
to enable subcontractors and suppliers to secure payment for their services.
But since the lien statutes were drafted for a purpose other than that for which
they are used, their coverage is insufficient and uncertain. In addition, pro-
cedural and administrative complexities aggravate the statutes' inadequacies.
One result of these inadequacies has been the emergence of the corporate
surety as a supplementary guarantor of payment and performance.15 Com-
pulsory bonding obtains at present on all federal and most state projects, and
on some private work as well. 16 Because the solvency of the corporate surety
is virtually assured by statute and by the self-regulation of the surety business
7
adequately bonding a contractor can eliminate any need to resort to the owner's
property by way of the lien statutes. In brief, bonding provides an alternative
to mechanics' liens as a method of protecting subcontractors and suppliers from
the manifold risks of the construction industry. The relative merits of bonding
and mechanics' liens form the basis of this Comment.
MECIHANICs' LIENS
A mechanic's lien is, essentially, the right of a builder to seek a judicial sale
of the owner's property in order to satisfy unpaid claims. All statutes dealing
with privately owned construction provide that the lien attaches to the improve-
ment and, in varying degrees, to the land on which it stands.18 So long as the
lienor remains unpaid, he is entitled to the security afforded by the property;
consequently, he may institute foreclosure proceedings and, along with other lien
14. The first mechanics' lien legislation in the United States was passed in response
to demands by the commission in charge of building Washington, D.C., and by Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison in particular. Rock, MECHANICS' LIENS 1 (1909). For
this first lien statute, see Md. Acts 1791, ch. 45, § 10. No similar legislation existed in
England at the time, nor has any been enacted since. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, MECHANICS'
LIENS 4 (1883). The French, however, have provisions similar to the mechanics' lien
acts. FRENCH CIVIL CODE, art. 2103 (Cachard 1930).
15. For a general discussion of the growth of the surety industry, see BACKMAN,
SURETY RATE-MAKING 1 (1949).
16. Almost all states and many municipalities require payment and/or performance
bonds on public works. For digested tabulation; see CREDIT MANUAL OF COMMERCIAL
LAwS 583 (1958) and notes 136-39 infra. In addition, the general contractor is usually
required to accompany his bid With a deposit or bond to guarantee that, if selected, he will
undertake the work awarded. See RnYNE, MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS 53 (1952).
17. See generally Crist, CORPORATE SURETYSHIP 52 (1939); LUNT, SURETY BONDS
13 (1922).
18. E.g., IOwA CODE ANN. § 572.2 (1946); N.Y. LIEN LAW §§ 3, 4 (Supp. 1958);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 21 (Supp. 1957). For a summary of all the state statutes, see
CREDIT MANUAL OF COMMERCIAL LAWS 592 (1958).
1958]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
claimants, share in any resulting distribution of proceeds.'9 The owner can
frequently discharge the lien by depositing a bond or sufficient cash with the
court.20 The available fund is then distributed among the lienors in such fashion
as the court may deem proper. Ordinarily, no personal liability for any de-
ficiency is imposed on the owner unless, of course, he was a party to the contract
under which the claim arose.
21
Computing the Lienable Claim
The value of a given mechanic's lien will depend in large measure on the
state law under which the claim arises. Roughly speaking, the statutes may be
divided into two general groups-the New York and the Pennsylvania types.
The New York Category. In New York, the subcontractor's lien is limited
to that part of the contract price due and owing to the general contractor from
the owner at the time that the notice of lien is given, plus any amount which
may become due thereafter.22 Thus, to recover a given sum, a subcontractor
19. See, e.g., A~iz. CODE ANN. § 62-214 (1939) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:44-97 (1953) ;
N.Y. LIEN LAW § 41. In New Jersey, however, the owner may cut off the right of lien
as against everyone but the general contractor by timely filing of the building contract
and specifications in the county clerk's office. Suburban Lumber Co. v. Gerber, 17 N.J.
Super. 33, 85 A.2d 275 (App. Div. 1951). The unpaid materialman or subcontractor must
then proceed by "stop notice," filing notice of nonpayment in the county clerk's office, to-
gether with actual notice to the owner of the claim. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:44-75-86 (1953).
Stop -notice operates as an assignment to the claimant, pro tanto, of the debt (if any) due
from the owner to the contractor. See, e.g., Commonwealth Roofing Co. v. Riccio, 81 N.J.
Eq. 486, 87 Atl. 114 (Ct. Err. & App. 1913). This procedure has the effect of substantially
delaying progress payments, particularly where claims have been exaggerated. The com-
parable procedure in New York involves paying a fund into court or the posting of a bond.
See note 20 infra.
20. E.g., N.Y. LIEN LAW §§ 20, 37; IOWA CODE ANN. § 572.15 (1949) ; TEX. Rxv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 5472b-1 (Supp. 1958).
21. See note 37 infra and accompanying text. Nor may the claimant bring a personal
action against the owner. See, e.g., Palmer v. Apperson, 70 Ariz. 35, 215 P.2d 1020 (1950);
Gignilliat v. West Lumber Co., 80 Ga. App. 652, 56 S.E.2d 841 (1949).
22. N.Y. LIEN LAW § 4 (Supp. 1958). Dempsey v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 186 App. Div.
334, 174 N.Y. Supp. 386 (1919); Szemko v. Weiner, 176 App. Div. 620, 163 N.Y. Supp.
382 (1917) ; McMillian v. Seneca Lake Grape & Wine Co., 5 Hun. 12 (Nassau County
Ct. 1875), rev'd on other groun&, 67 N.Y. 215 (1876) (discussing the form of the lien
right in terms of equitable subrogation). For modern cases applying the mechanic'
lien doctrine, see Owens v. Ebner, 74 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Nassau Suffolk
Lumber & Supply Corp. v. Bruce, 177 Misc. 825, 31 N.Y.S.2d 906 (Sup. Ct. 1941),
itodified, 265 App. Div. 879, 38 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1942). In the latter case, by the terms of the
general contract, the owner was to pay the general contractor in accordance with cash
advances made by a bank under a financing agreement with the owner. The bank sub-
sequently refused to make the advances because the building did not meet the require-
ments of the agreement. As nothing was therefore due to the general contractor, the court
held that there was no fund on which to predicate a materialman's lien.
The amount-due limitation exists in nineteen other jurisdictions: ALA. CODE ANN. tit.
33, § 37 (1940) (defeasible by notice) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7220 (1949) ; D.C. CODE
ANN. § 38-104 (1951) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 84.02-.05 (1943) ; ILL. Rev. STAT. ch. 82, § 21
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must show that at least the amount of his claim was owing to the general
contractor. And the owner generally may not be compelled to pay more than
the contract price.23 If the general contractor underbid the job, or if costs rose
unexpectedly during the course of the work, claims may exceed the amount
due, the excess constituting an unrecoverable loss which must be borne by the
general contractor, subcontractors and suppliers.2 4 If the general contractor
defaults after completing the work and receiving payment in full, the loss usually
will fall on the subcontractors and suppliers alone.
Because the owner is not liable to lienors for amounts which he has paid the
general contractor before any liens are filed,25 he can periodically reimburse the
general contractor with impunity on the basis of reports of work accomplished.
The New York type statute thus allows the owner to provide the general con-
tractor with a steady flow of cash which diminishes the latter's need to borrow
in order to meet his obligations to the subcontractors. Ordinarily, the owner
secures himself against nonperformance by retaining a certain percentage of
the amount payable each period; the general contractor receives these per-
centages after the project has been satisfactorily completed.20  Of course, a
general contractor can reduce his need for interim financing if he overreports
the amount of work finished during the initial stages and thereby actually draws
(1957); LA. Civ. CoDE ANN. art. 2772 (1951); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 254, § 4 (1956);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 372 (1942); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 447, §§ 5, 6 (1955); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:44-78 (1951); Nay. REv. STAT. § 108.050 (1956); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-6 (1949) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-254 (1952) ; S.D. CODE §§ 39.0701, .0703 (1939) ;
TEx REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5461 (Supp. 1958) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-22 (1953) ;
Vt. STAT. § 2754(11) (1947) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 43-7-8 (1950).
23. "If labor is performed for, or materials furnished to, a contractor or subcontractor
for an improvement, the lien shall not be for a sum greater than the sum earned and unpaid
on the contract at the time of filing the notice of lien, and any sum subsequently earned
thereon." N.Y. LIEN LAW § 4. See Herrmann & Grace v. Hillman, 203 N.Y. 435, 96 N.E.
741 (1911); Brainard v. County of Kings, 155 N.Y. 538 (1898). But see Richman v.
City of New York, 89 Misc. 213, 151 N.Y. Supp. 744 (Sup. Ct. 1915) (maverick decision).
24. Underbidding occurs frequently. Often it may be the result of a wholly speculative
estimate by a subcontractor whose quotation was obtained during the estimating period
and who then refuses to perform. Costs may rise after the contractor deliberately avoided
tie-ups, see note 4 supra, in the hope that costs would decrease by the time he eventually
made his subcontracts or material purchases. The frenzy of trying to meet a bid deadline,
much less competition, has produced odd results. Errors in general contractors' estimating
departments include failure to make provision for whole floors, walls and partitions, and
the analysis of two-way streets as though they were one lane. Further, unforeseen con-
ditions at the job site may materially increase costs. The discovery of rock or water
where easy excavation had been expected, either because of faulty borings or sheer
wishful thinking, can add tremendous expense.
25. In some jurisdictions, including New York, a lien is binding on the owner only
if he is subsequently served with notice. E.g., N.Y. LIEN LAW § 11; ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
82, § 24 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 429.100 (1951). Cf. INDY. STAT. ANN. § 43-709 (1952)
(personal liability of owner).
26. Retained percentages are required on state jobs in New York. N.Y. STATE FIN.
LAW § 139 (Supp. 1958). On private work, the average is 10%, though retained amounts
may occasionally be as high as 15 or 20%.
1958]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
down payments equivalent to or in excess of the full value of his services.
Since overreporting is apparently a common practice, the objective underlying
retained percentages is often defeated.
The general rule-that the owner is not liable for amounts paid the general
contractor before a lien is filed 27-- does not embrace payments which are
fraudulent as to subcontractors or suppliers. If the owner pays the general
contractor in a deliberate attempt to defeat a lienor's claim, the payment will
be held not to reduce the "amount due" for the purpose of computing the total
sum of liens allowable.2 8 Although the cases have not defined fraud with any
degree of precision in this context, they indicate that deviations from an existing
schedule which serve a bona fide business purpose are permissible.
2 9
The Pennsylvania Category. Under laws like Pennsylvania's, a subcontractor
may lien for the full value of his claim irrespective of the amount due the general
contractor.30 Because the general contractor is considered the owner's agent
for the hiring and directing of those who actually perform most of the con-
struction work,31 the subcontractor's right to lien is said to be "direct" rather
27. The owner also may not be liable if he has not received notice. Note 25 supra.
28. N.Y. LiEN LAw § 7; Glens Falls Portland Cement Co. v. Schenectady County Coal
Co., 163 App. Div. 757, 149 N.Y. Supp. 189 (1914), modifying 83 Misc. 552, 144 N.Y.
Supp. 519 (1913) ; Maycumber v. Wolfe, 10 Misc. 2d 464, 171 N.Y.S.2d 44 (Sup. Ct. 1958);
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:44-85 (1951); Hasson v. Bruzel, 104 N.J. Eq. 95, 144 Atl. 319 (Ch.
1929) ; cf. J.D. Loizeaux Lumber Co. v. Steinberg, 102 N.J.L. 15, 131 Atl. 131 (Sup. Ct.
1925).
29. See Wagner v. Butler, 155 App. Div. 425, 140 N.Y. Supp. 50 (1913); cf. Rosen-
baum v. Paletz, 114 N.Y. Supp. 802 (App. T. 1909); J. W. Van Cott & Son v. Gallon,
163 Misc. 914, 298 N.Y. Supp. 67 (Delaware County Ct. 1937).
If a general contractor's default is imminent and costs of completion are high, the
owner may decide to give the sinking contractor extra financing to avoid the losses in
both time and money involved in reletting the project. The extra financing, though non-
fraudulent, might be deemed an "amount due." Cf. Cosmopolitan Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Monarch Concrete Corp., 6 App. Div. Zd 163, 176 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1958).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 21 (1930) ; Bryan v. Stempkowski, 88 Pa. Super. 390
(1926). The following jurisdictions adhere to the Pennsylvania rule. Axuz. CODE ANN.
§ 62-201 (1939); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-601 (1947) ; CAL. CIv. PROC. CODS § 1183.1 (1955) ;
COLO. REV. STAT. ANY. § 86-3-1 (1953); DEL. CODE ANN. ch. 25, § 2702 (1953); GA.
CODE ANN. § 67-2001 (1935) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-501 (Supp. 1957) ; IND. STAT. ANN.
§§ 43-701, -713 (1952) ; IowA CODE ANN. § 572.5 (1946) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-
1401, -1403 (1949); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 376.040 (1955); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch.
178, § 34 (1954) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 63, § 1 (1957) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 26.281 (Supp.
1957); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 514.01 (1946); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 429.010 (1949); MONT.
Ry. CODES ANN. § 45-504 (1947) ; NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 52-102 '(1952) ; N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 61-2-2, -6 (1953) ; N.D. REv. CODE § 35-120 (1943) ; OxrA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42,
§ 143 (1951); ORE. REV. STAT. § 87.065 (1957); OHio Rav. CODE ANN. § 1311.02 (Page
1953); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 34, § 28-1-21 (1952); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64.1102
(1956); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 60.04.110 (1951); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3722 (1955);
Wis. STAT. § 289.02 (1955); Wyo. CoMr. STAT. ANN. § 55-201 (1945).
Under the Iowa code, if the lienor fails to file within the statutory period, an "amount
due" limitation takes effect. Iow0A CODE ANN. § 572.11 (1946).
31. See, e.g., Prince v. Neal-Millard Co., 124 Ga. 884, 53 S.E. 761 (1906) ; Weeter
Lumber Co. v. Fales, 20 Idaho 255, 118 Pac. 289 (1911) ; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
Leary, 25 S.D. 256, 126 N.W. 271 (1910).
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than "derivative." 32 Payments to the general contractor prior to the filing of
a lien therefore do not diminish the owner's total liability. 33
In some states with this type of statute, the total of recoverable liens may not
exceed the contract price.34 Unless, however, the owner is able to withhold
all payments to the general contractor until the period for the filing of liens has
expired, a provision limiting the aggregate of liens to the contract price does
not make that price the measure of the owner's actual liability, since he re-
ceives no credit for prior payments to the contractor. For this reason (among
others), some jurisdictions permit an owner who posts an appropriate bond,
or who publicly files the construction contract, to restrict his liability either
to the amount due or to the unpaid balance of the contract price.35 Absent such
a procedure, an owner may be forced to satisfy liens which, when added to
payments on the contract, exceed the contract price. Theoretically, he may
then sue the general contractor for the excess, but this right is likely to be
worthless because the general contractor is usually insolvent at this point.
3 6
Viewed superficially, the owner's liability would appear to be limited to the
foreclosure value of the lienable property, for deficiency judgments are rarely
awarded in this area.3 7 Actually, however, when the amount of lien claims is
32. E.g., Baker Sand & Gravel Co. v. Rogers Plumbing & Heating Co., 228 Ala. 612,
154 So. 591 (1934) ; cf. Hamilton v. Means, 155 Pa. Super. 245, 38 A.2d 528 (1944).
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 21 (1930) ; see Bryan v. Stempkowski, 88 Pa. Super. 390
(1926); Better Roofing Materials Co. v. Sztukovsld, 183 S.W2d 400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944);
cf. Florida Fruit Co. v. Shakelford, 145 Fla. 216, 198 So. 841 (1941).
34. See GA. CODE ANN. § 67-2001(2) (1933); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1403
(1949); Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 376.010 (1955); MIcia. STAT. ANN. § 26.281 (Supp.
1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 514.03 (1946); N.D. REv. CODE § 35-1207 (1943); OIalo
REV. CODE ANN. § 1311.05 (Page 1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, 143 (1938); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 64-1120 (1955).
35. Pennsylvania law provides that if the contract between owner and general con-
tractor stipulates for periodic payments and either is filed in the prothonotary's office
before work is commenced or is brought to the attention of the subcontractors and sup-
pliers prior to their furnishing services or materials, lien claims will be limited to the
balance of the contract price remaining unpaid at the time the liens are filed. Under this
provision, a court would stay all executions on judgments recovered on lien claims. By
paying the whole balance found due into court, the owner could then have the lien claims
stricken. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 76 (1930). The paucity of annotations and reported
cases on this provision indicate that it is infrequently invoked.
In many states, the owner may limit his liability to the "amount due" by posting
an appropriate bond prior to the commencement of the work. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. Psoc.
CODE § 1185.1(c) (1955), Roystone Co. v. Darling, 171 Cal. 526, 154 Pac. 15 (1915) ; COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 86-3-2 (1953) ; Munroe v. Merrell, 113 Mich. 491, 71 N.W. 850 (1897) ;
N.Y. LIEN LAW § 37 (Supp. 1958); National Gas Co. v. Ada Iron & ,Metal Co., 185
Okla. 415, 93 P.2d 529 (1939) ; W. VA: CODE ANq. § 3743 (1955), Atlas Powder Co. v.
Nelson & Chase & Gilbert Co., 124 W. Va. 298, 20 S.E.2d 890 (1942).
36. For the right of recovery over, see, e.g., A. CODE ANN. tit. 33, § 57 (1940).
See generally 5 CORBmIN, CoNTRAcTs §§ 1089-94 (1950).
37. In most jurisdictions, the question of deficiency judgments has not arisen. Only
three states expressly permit a mechanics' lienor whose claim is not satisfied by sale of
the property to go against the owner personally for the deficiency. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
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large, the owner is forced to choose between two equally unpromising possi-
bilities. He must either pay the claims-which may swell the total cost of
construction far beyond the original contract price-or else he must allow the
lienors to foreclose-thus forfeiting not only the property but also its future
use. Furthermore, on surrendering the project, he may have to respond in
damages to its prospective tenants. In resolving his dilemma, therefore, the
owner must compare the price of paying the liens with the cost of forfeiture,
that is, with the total anticipated losses resulting from his failure to finish the
project plus the value of his actual equity in the property and the improvement.
Owners who are subjected to the comparatively large lien claims permitted
under the Pennsylvania type of statute will ordinarily either require that general
contractors be adequately bonded, or will deal only with those who are heavily
capitalized. When the latter approach is chosen, successful competition by
small firms may be less common than in jurisdictions like New York. And
by discouraging payments during the course of a project, the Pennsylvania type
statute impedes the acquisition of funds which general contractors require.
38
Some Pennsylvania type jurisdictions go so far as to grant the owner im-
munity from any contractual claims of the general contractor until the period
during which other claimants may file their liens has elapsed.30 Since the statu-
tory period for filing by the last workman on the job does not start to run until
construction is completed, the owner who seeks to limit his total lien and con-
tract liability to the contract price will withhold all payments until some time
following the termination of work. Consequently, general contractors in these
states are forced to depend entirely on their own capital and outside loans to
finance building projects.
12, §§ 2621.1-.11 (1951), Hoffman Lumber Co. v. Mitchell, 170 Pa. Super. 326, 95 A.2d
664 (1952); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, § 19 (1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 514.15, 581.09
(1946) ; cf. Smude v. Amidon, 214 Minn. 266, 7 N.W.2d 776 (1943). Some states, on the
other hand, have emphatically rejected such deficiency actions. Chambers Lumber Co.
v. Gilmer, 60 Ga. App. 832, 5 S.E.2d 84 (1939); GA. CODE ANN. § 67-2001 (1933);
Jackson v. J. A. Franklin & Son, 107 Ind. App. 38, 23 N.E.2d 23 (1940); IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 43-709 (1952) ; Paulsen v. Western Elec. Co., 67 Okla. 309, 171 Pac. 38 (1918). If,
however, direct contractual liability has accrued simultaneously with the lien, deficiency
recovery against the owner is allowed. E.g., Ridens v. Economy Home Builders, 104 Cal.
App. 677, 286 Pac. 481 (Dist. Ct. App. 1930); Moody-Seagraves Ranch v. Brown, 69
S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
38. Despite these theoretical distinctions, states which follow the Pennsylvania type of
lien system seem to show only slightly larger losses incurred on contractor failures than
do states of the New York category. For example, in the middle Atlantic states (New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware and District of Columbia), failure
loss in 1956-1957 was 0.5% of total construction value. Here, the New York system
obtains except in Pennsylvania, which accounted for 21% of total construction. For the
same period in the far western states (California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Nevada,
Utah, Arizona), failure loss was 0.8% of construction. There, the Pennsylvania system
obtains except in Utah, which accounted for 3% of the total construction. These figures
are derived from Engineering News Record, Feb. 13, 1958.
39. E.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 572.13 (1950) ; KAx. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-1401, -1403




Pennsylvania Type Jurisdictions. While the general contractor and his im-
mediate subcontractors in direct-lien states have rights against the owner, sub-
contractors of a lesser degree and suppliers of labor and materials are sometimes
barred by statute or statutory construction from imposing mechanics' liens to
satisfy their claims. Whether or not a subcontractor or supplier may lien is of
practical importance, since his prospective rights are a determinant of the
price which he charges for his work, the manner in which he conducts it and,
ultimately, his ability to stay in business. Nonetheless, the criteria for de-
termining the class of lower subcontractors and suppliers entitled to lien not
only vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction but, in many states, are
imprecise as well. 40 Even when prescribed with any degree of clarity, limita-
tions on the right to lien often reflect an obsolete conception of the economics
and practices of the building industry.
41
Despite the variety, obsolescence and imprecision of statutory criteria, most
states ex-end the right to lien to everyone who supplies a construction project
with labor and materials. Courts in these jurisdictions pay little attention to
the distinctions between subcontractors and remote subcontractors or material-
men. Other commercially significant jurisdictions, however, restrict lien rights
by insisting that lienors qualify as "subcontractors. '42 Where the term has an
40. For the obscurity of statutory standards, see, e.g., Shaar v. Knickerbocker Ice Co.,
149 II. 441, 37 N.E. 54 (1894) ; People ex rel. Belson Mfg. Co. v. Wayne Elec. Motor Co.,
269 Mich. 537, 257 N.W. 817 (1934). See also Wood v. Isgrigg Lumber Co., 71 Ind. App.
64, 123 N.E. 702 (1919) ; Hightower v. Bailey, 108 Ky. 198, 56 S.W. 147 (1900).
A clarifying bill failed of enactment in New York. Proposed by the New York Law
Revision Committee in 1945, it would have specified the rights which labor and material
suppliers enjoy under surety bonds running to public corporations and state agencies.
N.Y. Legis. Docket No. 65L (1945). In New York, clarifying bond coverage would
clarify lien rights because of N.Y. STATE FIN. LAw § 137, which conditions bond recovery
on the proving of a lien (except for the "amount due" requirement).
41. See text at notes 56-59 infra.
42. Except when a direct contractual relationship with the owner can be shown,
in the following states liens have generally been denied for materials furnished to sub-
contractors. Delaware-Wilmington Sash & Door Co. v. Nuttall, 29 Del. (6 Boyce)
1, 95 Atl. 902 (Super. Ct. 1915) ; Georgia-General Supply Co. v. Hunn, 126 Ga. 615, 55
S.E. 957 (1906); Louisiana-Ketteringham v. Eureka Homestead Soc., 140 La. 176, 72
So. 916 (1916); Ohio-Stephens v. United R.R. Stockyards Co., 29 Ohio St. 227 (1876) ;
Pennsylvania-Favo v. Merlot, 94 Pa. Super. 90 (1928) ; Wisconsin-Dallman v. Clasen,
116 Wis. 113, 92 N.W. 565 (1902) ; District of Coluinbia-Sommerville v. Williams, 12
App. D.C. 520 (D.C. Cir. 1898) (dictum).
Definitions of "subcontractor" vary. Under some mechanics' lien statutes, a subcon-
tractor is one who contracts with the principal contractor. E.g., Stringfellow v. Coons
& Golder, 57 Fla. 158, 49 So. 1019 (1909). Elsewhere, courts have given the term a broader
meaning. Holt & Bugbee Co. v. City of Melrose, 311 Mass. 424, 426, 41 N.E.2d 562, 564
(1942) ("one who has entered into a contract, express or implied, for the performance of
an act with the person who has already contracted for its performance") ; Rogers v. Crane
Co., 180 Okla. 139, 68 P.2d 520 (1937) (similar). Still others restrict the term narrowly.
E.g., Hohn-Hammond Lumber Co. v. Elsom, 171 Cal. 570, 154 Pac. 12 (1915). Courts
have not infrequently expressed dissatisfaction with these various statutory definitions.
See, e.g., Duignan v. Montana Club, 16 Mont. 189, 40 Pac. 294 (1895).
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accepted definition, the problem of who may lien is easily resolved. 43 Else-
where, a claimant's rights may depend on whether the courts construe "sub-
contractor" functionally or by reference to the claimant's degree of "privity"
with the owner.44 Although no subcontractor can be in privity with an owner
in the strict, contractual sense, many judicial decisions use this term to indicate
that the owner has knowledge of, or an ability to select and direct, subcontrac-
tors of at least the first degree.45 Since the owner generally lacks similar
knowledge and control with respect to more remote subcontractors and sup-
pliers, they are frequently denied the right to lien.46 An exception to this
proposition might be made if the obvious presence of men on the job complete
with equipment and signs could be deemed sufficient notice to the owner. Con-
versely, a person who functions a a subcontractor off the jobsite may be char-
acterized as a supplier, and neither the services performed nor the items
furnished are universally recognized indicia of whether he is in fact a "sub-
contractor. '47 This distinction is crucial in jurisdictions limiting lien coverage
to "subcontractors."
43. For example, Pennsylvania (the most important, commercially, of the states which
limit the right of lien) gives precise content to the term "subcontractor." That
term is defined to include all persons who deal directly with the general contractor. Hence,
"subcontractor" comprehends many persons who ordinarily would be considered material-
men, and excludes subcontractors too far removed from the general contractor. PA. STAT.
AxN. tit. 49, § 4 (1930) ; Favo v. Merlot, supra note 42; Brown v. Cowan, 110 Pa. 588,
1 Atl. 520 (1885). This definition is inconsistent with Pennsylvania's direct-lien rationale
under which the general contractor is considered the owner's "agent." See notes 31, 32
supra and accompanying text. Given this rationale, a subcontractor of the first degree
should be viewed as the general contractor's agent for the letting of contracts; and the
owner, by the same doctrine of expectation, should be made liable for unpaid claims. For
cases wrestling with this problem, see Battista v. Horton, Myers & Raymond, 76 App.
D.C. 1, 128 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Eccleston v. Hetting, 17 font. 88, 42 Pac. 105
(1895); Duignan v. Montana Club, 16 Mont. 189, 40 Pac. 294 (1895). See also Note, 18
MONT. L. REv. 53, 55 (1956); Smith-Faris Co. v. Jameson Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 313 Pa.
254, 169 At. 233 (1933).
44. For "privity" cases, see, e.g., Spinney v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 123
Fla. 113, 166 So. 559 (1936); Harper Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Teate, 98 Fla. 1055, 125 So.
21 (1929).
45. Smith-Faris Co. v. Jameson Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 313 Pa. 254, 169 AtI. 233
(1933).
46. See, e.g., Economy Pumps v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 220 N.C. 499, 17 S.E.2d 639
(1942). For general discussion, see PHILLIPs, MECHAxics' LIENs 86 (1874).
47. The only consistent element among the decisions in this area is their inconsistency,
even within a single state. When the services furnished consist of supplying movable
items of furniture or equipment, the right of lien may be denied. E.g., Kalbach Lumber
Co. v. Red Ball Chain Stores Co., 196 Iowa 854, 195 N.W. 513 (1923). A company which
furnished material and labor to a subcontractor was, on the other hand, considered a
subcontractor because the work furnished was not included in the original plans. Appar-
ently, if the general contractor had been responsible for the item from the beginning, the
"subcontractor" would have been viewed as a supplier of a subcontractor and not entitled
to lien. Smith-Faris Co. v. Jameson Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 313 Pa. 254, 169 Atl. 233
(1933). The status of off-site subcontractors is not free of doubt even in jurisdictions
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States which restrict the right to lien do so on the theory that suppliers and
lower-degree subcontractors rely not on the credit of the improvement but on
that of the contractor directly above them.48 This assumption is by no means
an accurate reflection of normal trade practices. Only the law's denial of the
security of the improvement to remote subcontractors forces them to look solely
to the credit of higher-level contractors. In any event, those on the lower levels
must undertake risks without adequate information, for they are unlikely to
ascertain the credit standing of every subcontractor with whom they deal.
Even if such investigation were common, information of this sort would not
constitute insurance against subsequent defaults.
New York Type Jurisdictions. The New York "amount-due" rule extends
the right of lien to parties further down the contractual chain than does the
Pennsylvania type statute. In actuality, however, the limitations on protection
resulting from the subrogative nature of the New York lienor's position de-
crease his security considerably below that provided by a direct or Pennsylvania
lien. A lienor's rights under New York doctrine derive solely from the con-
tractor next above him and, ultimately, depend on the general contractor's
claim against the owner.49 Every lien on a given project is therefore limited
to the smallest amount due (and becoming due) to any contractor mediately
or immediately above the potential lienor at the time the lien is filed. 50 Thus,
no lienor can recover more than the sum which the owner owes the general
contractor. And if any party above the lienor is paid in full, the lienor is barred
from claiming against the project. Similarly, the default of any intermediary
party also breaks the subrogative chain and bars the claim of a lower party who
has not yet filed.r'
Since a New York lienor must prove the amount which was owing to the
general contractor, he may find foreclosure difficult.5 2 Any payments to the
which normally allow materialmen the right of lien. Cf. Stephens v. Holmes, 64 Ill. 336
(1872) (house moving); Staunton v. Cole & Fauber, 254 Ill. App. 377 (1929) (telephone
services).
48. 1 CUSHMAN, MECHANICS' LiENs IN PENNSYLVANIA 95-96 (1926) (collecting
cases).
49. See, e.g., Widenhouse v. Russ; 234 N.C. 382, 67 S.E.2d 287 (1951); Ruberoid Co.
v. Scott, 249 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
50. The rule is applied with particular stringency in New York. E.g., Wright v.
Schoharie Ry., 116 App. Div. 542 (1906), aff'd, 191 N.Y. 549, 85 N.E. 1118 (1908) ; French
v. Bauer, 134 N.Y. 548, 32 N.E. 71 (1892); Lumbard v. Syracuse, B. & N.Y.R.R., 55
N.Y. 491 (1874). For similar decisions in other jurisdictions of the New York type, see,
e.g., Koenig v. McCarthy Constr. Co., 344 Ill. App. 93, 100 N.E.2d 338 (1951) ; Thurber
Constr. Co. v. Kemplin, 81 S.W.2d 103, 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); cf. Hoggson Bros.
v. Dickason-Goodman Lumber Co., 81 Okla. 31, 196 Pac. 686 (1921).
51. Cf. Soll v. Camardella, 277 App. Div. 1004, 100 N.Y.S.2d 187 (1950); Owens v.
Ebner, 74 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
52. The lienor has and retains the burden of proof in a foreclosure proceeding.
Herrmann & Grace v. Hillman, 203 N.Y. 435, 96 N.E. 741 (1911); Brainard v. County
of Kings, 155 N.Y. 538, 50 N.E. 263 (1898) ; Beardsley v. Cook, 143 N.Y. 143, 38 N.E.
109 (1894); cf. Willard Co. v. City of New York, 81 Misc. 48, 142 N.Y. Supp. 9 (Sup.
Ct. 1913).
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general contractor subsequent to the filing of a lien are, of course, conclusive
evidence of the minimum amount due.53 But if payments have been suspended
and the owner does not acknowledge a specific indebtedness, the lienor is fre-
quently unable to prove the amount due.54 Even progress reports, when avail-
able, are not reliable indications of the value of the labor and material invested
in a project.5 On the one hand, overreporting is a notorious and widespread
practice; on the other, underreporting may occur when a job has been seriously
underbid and the general contractor is forced to limit his requests for payment
to what appears reasonable in light of the contract price. If the progress-pay-
ment system is not used and the contract is entire, a subcontractor cannot prove
any amount due except by demonstrating that the general contractor could
elicit payment through a suit in quantum meruit. 6 A showing that the general
contractor has substantially performed in good faith under the contract might
then sustain at least part of the subcontractor's lien. 57 Ironically, such proof
may be impossible if the subcontractor, in following the contractor's instructions,
furnished work which was at variance with the owner's plans and specifica-
tions.5 8 Analogously, if the general contractor has simply abandoned the work
and the contract was entire, a would-be lienor could recover nothing.59
Liens of the New York type are also diminished whenever an owner avails
himself of his right to apply the unpaid balance owed the general contractor
53. See, e.g., F. Bowden Co. v. Baler, 99 N.J.L. 361, 123 Atl. 737 (Sup. Ct. 1924)
(payment by owner after the filing of a stop-notice).
54. See American Radiator Co. v. City of New York, 223 N.Y. 193, 119 N.E. 389
(1918); Herrmann & Grace v. Hillman, 203 N.Y. 435, 96 N.E. 741 (1911); Foshay v.
Robinson, 137 N.Y. 134, 32 N.E. 104 (1893).
55. See, e.g., CRESWELL, BUILDING AND ENGINEERING CONTRACTS 176 (1957).
56. Ruddy v. McDonald, 244 Ill. 494, 499, 91 N.E. 651, 653 (1910); Bartson v. Wiekert,
193 Ill. App. 467 (1915). If specifically required by the contract, an architect's certificate
will also be considered a prerequisite to recovery. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Courtney, 158 Ill.
432, 41 N.E. 102 (1895) ; Michaelis v. Wolf, 136 Ill. 68, 26 N.E. 384 (1891).
Proof of the amount due by lienors is facilitated in the five jurisdictions which require
the owner, on demand, to furnish every claimant a copy of the general contract and a
statement of the amount due or to become due. These jurisdictions are California, District
of Columbia, Michigan, New York and Ohio.
57. Heckmann v. Pinkney, 81 N.Y. 211 (1880). An intentional and wilful departure
from the requirements of the contract or specifications will bar recovery. E.g., Cramer v.
Esswein, 220 App. Div. 10, 220 N.Y. Supp. 634 (1927).
58. For cases denying recovery, see, e.g., Terrell v. McHenry, 121 Ky. 452, 89 S.W.
306 (1905) (leaking roof); Fitzgerald v. Schaerfer, 216 S.W.2d 939 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949)
(defective materials) ; Mink v. Heep, 223 App. Div. 220, 227 N.Y. Supp. 698 (1928) (wrong
structure in wrong place). For cases allowing recovery, see, e.g., Coonse & Caylor Ice
Co. v. Howe Stove Co., 70 Ind. App. 226, 121 N.E. 293 (1918) \(defective stoker, later
removed); Bowen v. Phinney, 162 Mass. 593, 39 N.E. 283 (1895) (faulty paint job;
decision under statute no longer in force) ; W. H. Pipkorn Co. v. Tratnik, 161 Wis. 91,
152 N.W. 141 (1915) (walls condemned).
59. Lemieux v. English, 19 Misc. 545, 43 N.Y. Supp. 1066 (Sup. Ct. 1897); cf.
Herrmann & Grace v. Hillman, 203 N.Y. 435, 96 N.E. 741 (1911), afflrming 139 App. Div.
902, 123 N.Y. Supp. 1120 (1910).
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toward completing work under the contract. 60 Thus, the owner may finance the
actual cost of completion out of funds which were or eventually would have be-
come due the general contractor in the absence of default. 61 Even if a liquidated
sum is specifically due on the contract at the time that a lien is filed (or such a
sum becomes due thereafter), an exercise of the owner's rights will decrease
the amount available to lienors to the balance owed on the contract less the cost
of completion.62 The owner's rights under the law may be further enhanced by
provisions found in the vast majority of contracts. These permit the withholding
of an amount corresponding to the general contractor's overdue payments to
his suppliers and subcontractors, and also allow the general contractor's failure
to pay his subcontractors or suppliers to be treated as a material breach.
63
Lienability
Besides establishing that he is among the class of persons comprehended by
the statute, a potential lienor must demonstrate that the goods or services actually
rendered in the case at issue entitle him to a lien. Many items do not give rise
to liens because they are considered unnecessary to the construction process.
64
For example, some courts, evidently ignoring the technological developments of
the past century, will not enforce liens for fuel used to run building machinery 65
or to provide heat during cold-weather construction.6 6 Apparently, legal changes
60. The owner also may recover the cost of replacing defective work. See, e.g.,
Rubin v. Coles, 142 Misc. 139, 253 N.Y. Supp. 803 (N.Y. City Ct. 1931).
61. Van Clief v. Van Vechten, 130 N.Y. 571, 577, 29 N.E. 1017 (1892) ; De Lorenzo
v. Von Raitz, 44 App. Div. 329, 60 N.Y. Supp. 736 (1899) ; Clark v. Fleischmann Vehicle
Co., 187 N.Y. Supp. 807 (Sup. Ct. 1921) ; J. W. Van Cott & Son v. Gallon, 163 Misc. 914,
922, 298 N.Y. Supp. 67 (Delaware County Ct. 1937) (dictum).
Any retained percentages from previous payments may be freely used by the owner
in the course of completing the project after a default by the general contractor. If these
percentages are exhausted, the lienor may not include them in computing the "amount
due," for, under the contract, they are not due. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
62. JENSEN, MECHANIcS' LIENS § 307 (3d ed. 1929) (collecting cases).
63. For such a provision in a widely used contract form, see PARKER & ADAMS, THE
A.I.A. STANDARD CONTRACT FoniS AND THE LAW 91, 92 (arts. 22, 26(c)) (1954).
An owner who withholds amounts corresponding to the general contractor's overdue
debts is likely to pay them directly to the general contractor's creditor subcontractors and
suppliers. But if an owner elects to treat the general contractor's arrearage as a material
breach, the subcontractors and suppliers will probably lose all but their legal and equitable
remedies with respect to the project.
64. See generally Profits Not Lienable, 28 HEATING, PIPING & AIR-CONDITIONING 141
(1956) ; Law and Profits, 25 HEATING, PIPING & AIR-CONDITIONING 110 (1953). See also
cases cited, notes 65-68 infra.
65. Cincinnati R. & M.R.R. v. Shera, 36 Ind. App. 315, 73 N.E. 293 (1905) ; Shultz
v. C. H. Quereau Co., 210 N.Y. 257, 104 N.E. 621 (1914) ; Richstein v. Roesch, 71 S.D.
451, 25 N.W.2d 558 (1946) ; Carnegie Fuel Co. v. Interstate Transfer Ry., 165 Wis. 46,
160 N.W. 1046 (1917).
66. Schroeter Bros. Hardware Co. v. Croatian "Sokol" Gymnastic Ass'n, 332 Mo. 440,
58 S.W.2d 995 (1933). Contra, Oliver L. Taetz, Inc. v. Groff, 363 Mo. 825, 253 S.W.2d
824 (1953) ; Walker v. Collins Constr. Co., 121 Neb. 157, 236 N.W. 334 (1931).
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have likewise gone unobserved. Contractors may not lien for premiums paid
on workmen's compensation or public liability insurance, nor for licensing or
other taxes essential to the conduct of building operations. 67 Thus, the lienor may
fail to recover many costs integral to his performance on a given project. And,
prior to undertaking a job, he will be uncertain about the lienability of numerous
items whose status remains unlitigated. At present, liens may represent only
the value of goods or services made "a part of the improvement," but confusion
reigns supreme under the various imprecise restatements and conflicting applica-
tions of this vague standard. 68
Filing and Attachment
Depending on the jurisdiction, a properly filed lien will effectively attach as
of either the day the original contract was made, the time of breaking ground,
the date of filing, or the moment when the lienor commenced or completed
work.69 The right to lien is lost if filing does not occur within the time specified
by law.70 A failure to comply exactly with the statutory requirements prevents
an applicant from even attaining the status of a lienor, because the lien acts are
strictly construed as derogations of the owner's common-law rights.71 In a
number of jurisdictions, a lienor must not only file properly but also notify
the owner of the claim; lien rights against the owner will then depend on and
67. E.g., Mann v. Schnarr, 228 Ind. 654, 95 N.E2d 138 (1950) ; Hoier v. Kaplan, 313
Ill. 448, 145 N.E. 243 (1924). But see Bangor Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Robbins
Plumbing Co., 151 Me. 145, 116 A2d 664 (1955).
68. For a case reflecting this confusion, see Barnes v. Montana Lumber & Hardware
Co., 67 Mont. 481, 216 Pac. 335 (1923).
In many jurisdictions, recovery for items under a surety bond is made dependent on
the initial liability of the item. See Wilson-Stamey Grocery Co. v. Ross, 194 N.C. 109,
138 S.E. 537 (1927) ; Park, What Constitutes Labor and Material in a Labor and Material
Bond, 16 INs. CouNsEr. J. 14 (1949). Other states take the opposite view-that the lien
law does not control in construing the bond. E.g., American Sur. Co. v. James A. Dick
Co., 23 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1927) (applying New Mexico law); Fuller v. Brooks, 117
Okla. 252, 246 Pac. 369 (1926); Franzen v. Southern Sur. Co., 35 Wyo. 15, 246 Pac. 30
(1926).
69. The lien attaches as of the time work commences on the building or improvement
in: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Mary-
land, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Tennessee and Wyoming. The date notice of lien is filed controls in: Arizona, Mississippi,
Missouri, North Dakota, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas,
Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin. The lien attaches as of the actual date on which
labor or supplies were furnished in: Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Utah and West Virginia. The remaining
jurisdictions have less precise rules.
70. E.g., Ma. REv. STAT. AN. ch. 178, § 36 (1954); Marshall v. Mathieu, 143 Me.
167, 57 A.2d 400 (1948); N.Y. LIza LAW § 10; Stevens v. Ogden, 130 N.Y. 182, 29
N.E. 229 (1891).
71. E.g., Kelley v. Springer, 235 Ill. 493, 85 N.E. 593 (1908) ; Heidenbluth v. Rudolph,
152 III. 316, 38 N.E. 930 (1894); cf. Hoffman Lumber Co. v. 'Mitchell. 170 Pa. Super.
326, 85 A2d 664 (1952).
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date from such notification.72 Filing, however, need not always await the ex-
istence of an unpaid, matured claim, since some states allow filing immediately
upon the completion of work or even before the delivery of materials.73
Priorities
Under the majority of statutes, all lienors of the same class who file within
the statutory period receive equal treatment without regard to the order in
which their claims arose or their liens were filed. Thus, on foreclosure, all
subcontractors and suppliers, who are treated as a class, share pro rata that
class's portion of the proceeds. 74 Priorities exist among classes, however, so
that ordinarily the liens of subcontractors and suppliers take precedence over
those of the general contractor,75 and the liens of laborers for daily wages are
satisfied first.
76
A valid subcontractor's lien on the property may be subordinated not only
to laborers' liens but also to claims by creditors of the general contractor. In
some jurisdictions following the New York rule, when the general contractor
assigns his rights under the contract to secure loans from a third party, prece-
dence as between a subcontractor and the assignee will depend on the order in
which the subcontractor's lien and fhe assignment are filed.77 Since, under the
New York rule, the owner cannot be compelled to pay more than the amount
due the contractor, an assignee's priority diminishes pro tanto the lien claims
allowable against the owner's property.7 8 Moreover, under the first-in-time,
72. For statutes of this sort, see note 25 supra.
73. See, e.g., Palmer Lumber Co. v. Stern, 140 App. Div. 680, 125 N.Y. Supp. 594
(1910) ; Saginaw Lumber Co. v. Wilkinson, 266 Mich. 661,254 N.W. 240 (1934) ; Benning v.
Farmers' Bank, 190 S.W. 983 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916).
74. E.g., ARiz. CODE ANN. § 62-215 (1939) ; DEI- CODE ANN. tit 25, § 2720 (1953);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 84.20 (1943).
75. E.g., N.Y. LIEN LAW § 56; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 84.06 (1943).
76. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 67-2002(3) (1938); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 26.296 (1953);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:44-86 (1952); N.Y. LIEN LAW § 13(1), American Radiator Co.
v. City of New York, 223 N.Y. 193, 198, 119 N.E. 391, 393 (1918) ; OIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1311.13 (Page 1953); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 92-96, 171 (1954), Central Fin.
Corp. v. Brown, 175 Okla. 528, 54 P.2d 196 (1936).
77. Riverside Contracting Co. v. City of New York, 218 N.Y. 596, 113 N.E. 564
(1916); S.C. CODE § 45-252 (1952); VT. STAT. § 2754(IV) (1947); Weissman v. Volino,
84 Conn. 326, 80 Atl. 81 (1911) ; Gray v. McClellan, 214 Mass. 92, 100 N.E. 1093 (1913);
Landers-Morrison-Christenson Co. v. Ambassador Holding Co., 171 Minn. 445, 214 N.W.
503 (1927); Haney-White Co. v. Stafford, 96 N.J.L. 283, 114 AtI. 746 (Ct. Err. & App.
1921) ; Kingsport Brick Corp. v. Bostwick, 145 Tenn. 19, 235 S.W. 70 (1921) ; Guaranty
Title & Trust Co. v. Thompson, 93 Fla. 983, 113 So. 117 (1927) (dictum).
78. Bates v. Salt Springs Nat'l Bank, 157 N.Y. 322, 51 N.E. 1033 (1898); Lauer v.
Dunn, 115 N.Y. 405, 22 N.E. 270 (1889) ; New York County Nat'l Bank v. Wood, 169
App. Div. 817, 153 N.Y. Supp. 860 (1915), aff'd, 222 N.Y. 662, 119 N.E. 1062 (1918);
Contractors' Supply Co. v. City of New York, 153 App. Div. 60, 138 N.Y. Supp. 242
(1912) ; Tapai v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383, 19 Pac. 641 (1888) ; cf. Rubinstein v. Jamaica
Nat. Bank, 40 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Sup. Ct. 1943). But see John Murtland, Inc. v. Empire Trust
Co., 39 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1930). In many jurisdictions, if the monies advanced under
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first-in-right theory, the prior filing of an assignment will defeat a lien even
if the funds advanced by the assignee were wasted or used on a different pro-
ject.7 9 Of course, the lender-assignee may require that the monies advanced
be held by the contractor as a trust fund for the payment of construction costs.
This requirement will not protect the lienor, however, once the fund has been
misappropriated. In New York, misuse of the fund is a crime, but prosecutions
are rare.80 The lienor's civil action against the contractor for wasting the trust
is also ineffective because of the contractor's normal financial condition when
liens are being foreclosed.81
In addition, a subcontractor's lien rights may be subordinated to the rights of
creditors of the owner. His priority is usually lower than that of purchase-
money or general-construction mortgagees, unless his lien attached before
the filing of the mortgage.82 Moreover, in a few jurisdictions the mortgagee
has first priority regardless of when the mechanic's lien attaches, so long
as the mortgage is recorded during construction and contains provisions which
bar any diversion of the mortgage funds from the project.83 In one of these
states, the mortgagee does not receive the same incentive to lend, because he
may lose his priority if the funds advanced are actually diverted from the
improvement.8 4 Departing from the usual all-or-nothing approach to priori-
a mortgage financing an improvement are mingled with the mortgagor's general funds,
the mortgage will take precedence over the mechanic's lien only to the extent of the
sum actually used in erection of the improvement. See W. P. Fuller & Co. v. McClure,
48 Cal. App. 185, 191 Pac. 1027 (Dist. Ct. App. 1920); Riverside Apartment Corp. v.
Capitol Constr. Co., 107 N.J. Eq. 405, 152 Atl. 763 (Ch. 1930), aff'd, 110 N.J. Eq. 67,
158 Atl. 740 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932) ; Micele v. Falduti, 101 N.J. Eq. 103, 137 Atl. 92 (Ch.
1927); Haney-White Co. v. Stafford, mtpra note 77; Friedman v. Board of Educ., 256
App. Div. 318, 10 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1939) (public contract); Vacuum Oil Co. v. Liberty
Ref. Co., 265 S.W. 749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
79. See note 69 m.pra.
80. For the criminal provision, see N.Y. LIE LAw §§ 13(3), (7), 36(a) (Supp. 1958)
cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-1142 (1955).
81. The civil action is authorized by N.Y. LIEN LAw § 36.
82. Franklin Soc'y v. Thornton, 85 N.J. Eq. 37, 95 Atl. 374 (Ch. 1915). A purchase-
money mortgage given by one who purchases the property after construction has begun
takes precedence over mechanics' liens despite the fact that the building may be nearly
complete at the time the mortgage is executed. Gibbs v. Grant, 29 N.J. Eq. 419 (Ch. 1878).
83. E.g., N.Y.- LIEN LAW § 13(2), (3); Telsey v. Calvin-Morris Corp., 260 N.Y.
456, 184 N.E. 53 (1933), affirming 235 App. Div. 722, 255 N.Y. Supp. 964 (1932). Sections
13(2) and (3) of the New York act do not apply to purchase-money mortgages. Shilowitz
v. Wadler, 237 App. Div. 330, 261 N.Y. Supp. 35 (1932); cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:44-87,
89 (1951) (imposing a duty on the mortgagee to see that advances made are applied to
the project) ; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1311.14 (Page 1953).
84. Riverside Apartment Corp. v. Capitol Constr. Co., 107 N.J. Eq. 405, 152 Atl. 763
(Ch. 1930), aff'd, 110 N.J. Eq. 67, 158 Atl. 740 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932). The requirements
placed on the lender by the New Jersey approach seem unduly burdensome; he must either
continually police the general contractor or run the risk of losing his security. See Holl,
Construction Loans, 70 N.J.L.J. 289 (1947).
Under the New Jersey system, a construction (non-purchase-money) mortgage takes
first priority only if, at the time of recording or registering, the building on the land has
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ties, certain western states set aside only the value of the land to meet the
claims of mortgagees, and reserve the value of the improvement to satisfy
contractors' liens pro rata.s5
Whenever the time of filing governs the lienor's rights as against other
classes of creditors, the unpaid subcontractor or supplier may be well advised
to file early. By so doing, however, he can precipitate the filing of other liens
which, in turn, can cause the general contractor's default. For instance, the
owner may treat the general contractor's now-obvious failure to pay as a
default under a "no unpaid claims" clause in the contract, or as a material
breach in the absence of such a clause. 86 Or else, subcontractors may slow
down their work progress until payment is forthcoming, or may abandon
the job to sell their services to a more reliable buyer. Likewise, laborers may
leave of their own accord or be removed by their unions. Furthermore, credit
sources on which the general contractor depends will probably be cut off,
and his creditors on other jobs may demand immediate payments which he
is unable to make.
Many lien statutes partially solve the problem of precipitous filing by allow-
ing a lien to relate back to a time earlier than the date of filing. 7 The unpaid
subcontractor can thus postpone filing without being prejudiced by interven-
ing claims. In addition, since most statutes treat all valid mechanics' liens
equally, regardless of the time of filing, the subcontractor generally does not
forfeit any priority by waiting. As a consequence, accumulated liens leading
to a general contractor's default may be avoided. On the other hand, the
longer an inevitable default is deferred, the larger the liens that will eventually
be filed can become and the smaller each prospective lienor's share on foreclosure
is likely to be.88 The unpaid subcontractor must therefore weigh the chance
that his postponement of filing will enable the contractor to avoid default
against the possibility that accumulating claims will diminish his eventual re-
covery. And the potential lender must remember that the relation-back
been substantially or fully completed and no mechanics' notices of intention to lien have
been filed; or if no buildings, excavation, footing or foundation is on the land; or if no
labor or materials have been furnished for building within four months of the time of
recording or registering. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :44-88 (1950) ; cf. Companaro v. Gondolfo,
60 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1932). A mortgage which is part purchase-money and part to
secure a loan for actual construction generally takes precedence over mechanics' liens
in New Jersey. Franklin Soc'y v. Thornton, 85 N.J. Eq. 37, 95 At. 374 (Ch. 1915).
85. See, e.g., MoNT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 45-501 (1947). This approach has
been followed in Illinois. ILi. REv. STAT. ch. 82, § 16 (1957) ; Bradley v. Simpson, 93 Ill. 93
(1879); cf. Newark Lime & Cement Co. v. Morrison, 13 N.J. Eq. 133 (Ch. 1860); Grand
Opera House Co. v. Maguire, 14 Mont. 558, 37 Pac. 607 (1894).
Under the Illinois approach, the value of the lien is the market value added to the
property by the improvement, not the value of the labor and materials furnished. Valuation
is thus unnecessarily complex. See Crosky v. North W. Mfg. Co., 48 Ill. 481 (1868).
86. For these clauses, see note 63 .stpra and accompanying text.
87. See note 69 supra.
88. These disadvantages may be partially offset in jurisdictions of the New York type,
since the later a default the larger the "amount due" may be.
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statutes can operate to cause liens arising on claims not yet in existence to
assume priority and diminish, if not altogether extinguish, his security.80
A few jurisdictions apply the first-in-time, first-in-right theory among all
mechanics' lienors. 90 Since the time of filing determines priority in these
states, the incentive to file early is strong, and the first filing may trigger a
deluge of liens and, ultimately, a default.
Diversion of Funds
A lienor whose claim has arisen on one project may not assert his lien against
either the amount due or the property on any other project which the general
contractor has undertaken, even when the owner is also the same.90 Similarly
immune are funds due the general contractor for other work on the same
construction project, if the work was performed under an agreement separate
from the general contract.9 2 These restrictions--confining lien rights to the
project on and contract under which the claimant worked-do not comport
with common business practice. A contractor will frequently finance one job
with payments from other projects for which funds are readily available. This
robbing of Peter to pay Paul occurs even in states where statutory provisions
denominate revenues from a given project as a trust fund for the payment of
that project's creditors, and make any diversion of the fund a felony. Enforcing
such a trust is impractical, for the process of tracing diverted funds is fraught
with difficulty unless the contractor has been both honest and accurate in his
bookkeeping. Not suprisingly, under-financed, speculating contractors whose
bookkeeping is purposely unclear are those who most often engage in inter-
project financial maneuvering. Thus, the mechanics' lien statutes fail to pro-
tect the subcontractor and supplier against yet another important cause of de-
fault and ultimate loss. On the other hand, were the innocent transferees of
wrongly diverted funds forced to disgorge, and were liens freely enforceable
on all of a general contractor's projects, the determination of priorities and the
interaction of defaults might engender a confusion so great that the remedy
would turn out to be worse than the current wrongdoing.
89. Federal Land Bank v. Green, 108 Mont. 56, 90 P.2d 489 (1939) ; Federal Trust
Co. v. Guigues, 76 N.J. Eq. 495, 498, 74 Atl. 652 (Ch. 1909) ; Erdman v. Moore, 58 N.J.L.
445, 33 Atl. 958 (Sup. Ct. 1896). See also Davis v. Bilsland, 85 U.S. 659 (1873) (constru-
ing Montana law).
90. E.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 572.17 (1949).
91. E.g., C. T. Willard Co. v. City of New York, 81 Misc. 48, 142 N.Y. Supp. 9
(Sup. Ct. 1913); Quinlan v. Russel, 94 N.Y. 349 (1884). Consequently, the mechanics'
lienor is at a comparative disadvantage. Certain classes of creditors-in particular the
federal government as lienholder for unpaid taxes-may reach other funds in order to
satisfy debts arising from the principal job; conversely, they may also reach the fund
due the contractor on the principal job to satisfy liens on other projects. See Kennedy, The
Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and
General Lien, 63 YAIx L.J. 905 (1954) ; cf. Note, 66 YAEI L.J. 797 (1957).
92. Streever Lumber Co. v. Mitchell, 183 App. Div. 129, 170 N.Y. Supp. 272 (1918).
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Owner Consent and Disclaimer
A subcontractor or supplier who has safely negotiated the obstacles dis-
cussed thus far may still lose part or all of his lien. Property is lienable only
if the general contractor was engaged on the authority of a person who is the
property's "owner" within the meaning of the statute. 3 Frequently, liens are
invalidated because they are on improvements whose construction was author-
ized by a tenant or other holder of less than a fee simple interest in the property.
The average subcontractor or supplier rarely examines the pertinent title records,
and may not even be aware of the significance of the property interest in the
apparent owner. The farther down the contract chain a subcontractor or sup-
plier is, the more protection he will need against his own ignorance and lack
of diligence.
Before a mechanic's lien may attach to land or the improvement at issue,
the fee owner of the property must consent to the construction of the improve-
ment. What constitutes consent has been resolved in a bewildering variety of
ways.0 4 In New York, the owner's "mere knowledge" that work is going for-
ward coupled with his acquiesence has been held insufficient evidence of his
consent. 0 Some New York decisions express the view that consent can arise
in a specific contract but not in an owner's written agreement to the effect that
his lessee may make and pay for repairs or minor alterations and additionsY
6
Other New York cases hold, however, that when the conduct and attitude of
the owner indicate a willingness to benefit by the improvement, his consent
will be implied. 7 Inconsistencies of this sort are by no means limited to New
York. 8
93. E.g., N.Y. LIEN LAw § 3 (Supp. 1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :44-68 (1951);
Du.. CoDE ANN. tit. 25, § 2722 (1953).
94. E.g., Valenti v. New York Theatre Co., 99 Misc. 517, 166 N.Y. Supp. 76, 77
(Sup. Ct. 1917) (knowledge and acquiescence not sufficient to constitute consent); Avery
v. Smith, 96 Conn. 223, 113 Atl. 313 (1921) (agreement to be liable is required); Clark
v. North, 131 Wis. 599, 111 N.W. 681 (1907) (a "meeting of the minds" and a common
understanding as to who should pay required).
95. Petrillo v. Pelham Bay Park Land Co., 119 Misc. 146, 196 N.Y. Supp. 124 (Sup.
Ct. 1922) ; Garber v. Spivak, 65 Misc. 37, 119 N.Y. Supp. 269 (Sup. Ct. 1909) ; cf. Crowley
Bros. v. Ward, 322 Ill. App. 687, 54 N.E.2d 753 (1944).
96. C. Wilson's Plumbing Shop on Wheels, Inc. v. Trustees of Dartmouth College,
168 Misc. 376, 6 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Valenti v. New York Theatre Co., 99 Misc.
517, 166 N.Y. Supp."76 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
97. Majestic Tile Co. v. Nicholls, 161 Misc. 231, 291 N.Y. Supp. 551 (Nassau County
Ct. 1936) ; Marsh v. Lemon Thomson Realty Corp., 174 App. Div. 218, 160 N.Y. Supp. 138
(1916).
98. The Pennsylvania statute requires written evidence that the improvement is in-
tended for the owner's immediate use and benefit. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 24 (1930).
But the statute also imposes liability on the owner whenever the tenant "acts as if he were
the owner" and makes a contract for which a claim could be filed, and the owner, knowing
this, does not object. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 28 (1930). The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania construed §§ 24 and 28 to mean that, while the owner may consent to his tenant's
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Attempted statutory reforms have not proved successful. A Minnesota act
-- copied in other jurisdictions-establishes a conclusive presumption that the
real owner of the land has authorized any improvement of which he was aware
at any time during its construction. 9 But the act intdntionally provides a loop-
hole which, practically speaking, enables an owner to negate the presumption.
If he has not engaged the general contractor, has not expressly consented to
the project, and gives adequate and timely notice of his "nonresponsibility" for
the work, no mechanic's lien may attach to his interest.100 Thus, once notice
is effected, a claimant under the statute, like a claimant without the statute,
must prove consent in fact. In some jurisdictions the owner may give notice
by putting a disclaimer on public file.' 0' This procedure manifestly will not
influence those many subcontractors or suppliers who are so unsophisticated
as to fail to search the public records for evidence of every apparent owner's
true status and every feeholder's disclaimer.
In Pennsylvania and a number of other states, the contractor and the lessee
and lessor of the property can destroy all right of lien through publicly filing
the contract. The contractor can incorporate a waiver of his and his sub-
ordinates' lien rights in the contract, and the real and apparent owners can both
insert disclaimers of responsibility, even though one of them engaged the gen-
eral contractor. 0 2 Furthermore, an unfiled disclaimer is effective against any
improvements without assuming liability for the work done, liability should be imposed
if the owner was put on notice that the contractor believed that the tenant had authority
to make an agreement which would bind the property, and the owner failed to object. Fluke
v. Lang, 283 Pa. 54, 128 Atl. 663 (1925). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:44-68 (1951).
Owner attempts to avoid liability by using improvement leases which permit but do not
require the lessee to build ordinarily fail, because courts usually find that improvements
have actually been erected at the behest of the owner. See, e.g., Hall v. Parker, 94 Pa.
109 (1880); cf. Watson Land & Improvement Co. v. Salyers, 247 Pa. 454, 93 Ati. 495
(1915) ; Annot., 79 A.L.R. 962, 965 (1932).
99. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 514.06 (1947). The constitutionality of this provision has
not yet been tested. The Minnesota act has been copied in CAL. CiV. PRoc. CODE § 1183.1
(1955); NEv. REv. STAT. § 108.140 (1956); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-2-10 (1953); Om
REV. STAT. §§ 87.030, .265 (1953) ; S.D. CODE § 39.0706 (1939).
100. Ott Hardware Co. v. Yost, 69 Cal. App. 2d 593, 159 P.2d 663 (Dist. Ct. App.
1954) ; Western Lumber & Mill Co. v. Merchants' Amusement Co., 13 Cal. App. 4, 108 Pac.
891 (Dist. Ct. App. 1910) ; Skidmore v. Eby, 57 N.M. 669, 262 P.2d 370 (1953) ; Petrakis
v. Krasnow, 54 N.M. 39, 213 P.2d 220 (1949) ; Nicolai-Neppach Co. v. Poore, 120 Ore. 163,
251 Pac. 268 (1926); Oregon Lumber & Fuel Co. v. Nolan, 75 Ore. 69, 143 Pac. 935
(1914), aff'd on rehearing, 75 Ore. 81, 146 Pac. 474 (1915).
101. NEv. RET. STAT. § 108.140 (1956).
Another means of giving notice 'is to post at the project site conspicuous signs on
which appear disclaimers of responsibility. E.g., ORE. Rav. STAT. § 87.030 (1953) ; Mlar-
shall v. Cardinell, 46 Ore. 410, 80 Pac. 652 (1905) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-2-10 (1953).
Such posting will obviously afford little notice to suppliers or remote subcontractors who
do not actually appear on the jobsite.
102. Contractual provisions against mechanics' liens have been held valid in the followv-
ing states: Connecticut-Weinberg v. Valente, 79 Conn. 247, 64 Atl. 337 (1906) ; Illinois-
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subcontractor who had actual notice of it prior to furnishing labor or materials.10 3
An intermediate group of jurisdictions, on the other hand, hold that the sub-
contractor retains his right to lien unless he has clearly assented to be bound by a
waiver or disclaimer.10 4 And states following the New York rule refuse to recog-
nize any form of exculpatory clause favoring the owner, irrespective of the
lienor's prior consent ;105 an express contract not to lien is enforceable, how-
ever. 00
The reasons behind the states' divergent views on owners' disclaimers is
relatively clear. In Pennsylvania, the owner's direct liability to all lienors, once
established, is virtually unlimited.10 7 But in New York, the owner is never
liable beyond the amount due the general contractor, and the added protection
of a disclaimer would therefore border on the gratuitous.
08
Although the Pennsylvania owner needs some method by which to limit
his liability, to allow him to do so completely at the expense of every prospec-
tive lienor seems unfair. No perfect answer to the disclaimer question is fore-
seeable, however, because the lien system necessarily contemplates that some
relatively innocent party will eventually sustain whatever loss occurs. Possibly,
the best solution in Pennsylvania type jurisdictions would be to allow dis-
claimers for all liens above the contract price-a readily ascertained and not
unreasonable limit.10 9
Harman H. Hettler Lumber Co. v. Hodge, 227 Ill. App. 383 (1923) ; Indiana--Fuhrman v.
Frech, 60 Ind. App. 349, 109 N.E. 781 (1915) ; Iowa-Van Dyck Heating & Plumbing Co.
v. Central Iowa Bldg. Co., 200 Iowa 1003, 205 N.W. 650 (1925) ; Maryland-Pinning v.
Skipper, 71 Md. 347, 18 Atl. 659 (1889); Minnesota-Cushing v. Hurley, 112 Minn. 83,
127 N.W. 441 (1910); Missouri-Isenman v. Fugate, 36 Mo. App. 166 (1889) ; Nebraska
-Frost v. Falgetter, 52 Neb. 692, 73 N.W. 12 (1897) ; Oregon-Hughes v. Lansing, 34
Ore. 118, 55 Pac. 95 (1898) ; Pewtsylvaia-Long v. Caffrey, 93 Pa. 526 (1880); Wiscon-
sin- Brzezinski v. Neeves, 93 Wis. 567, 67 N.W. 1125 (1896); compare Davis v. La
Crosse Hosp. Ass'n, 121 Wis. 579, 99 N.W. 351 (1904).
Similar provisions have been held valid as to subcontractors but not as to the general
contractor. Idaho-Smith v. Faris-Kesl Constr. Co., 27 Idaho 407, 150 Pac. 25 (1915);
Illinois-Concord Apartment House Co. v. O'Brien, 128 Ill. App. 437, aft'd, 228 Ill. 476,
81 N.E. 1076 (1906); Massachusetts-Porier v. Desmond, 177 Mass. 201, 58 N.E. 684
(1900).
103. E.g., Bennar v. Central Mausoleum Co., 304 Pa. 569, 156 Atl. 239 (1931). See
McCrady-Rodgers Co. v. Nenoff, 155 Pa. Super. 555, 39 A.2d 260 (1944). The "no lien"
provision need not be in a separate contract, but may be contained in the principal contract.
Deets v. Freed, 165 Pa. Super. 495, 69 A.2d 159 (1949).
104. E.g., Morin Lumber Co. v. Person, 110 Mont. 114, 99 P.2d 206 (1940). The
fact that the subcontractor has knowledge of such an agreement does not bind him unless
he clearly assented to it. Cf. Higby v. Hooper, 124 Mont. 331, 221 P.2d 1043 (1950).
105. E.g., North Am. Iron Works, Inc. v. G. De Kimpe, Inc., 232 App. Div. 579, 251
N.Y. Supp. 144 (1931) ; Carroll McCreary Co. v. People, 267 N.Y. 37, 195 N.E. 675 (1935).
106. N.Y. LIEN LAw § 34.
107. See text at note 30 supra.
108. See text at note 22 supra.
109. One further aspect of the disclaimer problem involves owners of property who
hold it as trustees under instruments which do not authorize the making of improvements.
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LICENSING
Much of the subcontractor and supplier's need for protection stems from
the presence of professionally unfit and thinly capitalized contractors in the
construction industry. Seeking to reduce the incidence of default caused by
incompetence or insolvency, most states have enacted legislation which re-
quires contractors to be licensed or otherwise to meet minimum standards.")
These laws are of three main types. The first establishes prerequisites to the
awarding of public-works contracts (both state and municipal) by limiting
the bidding on such contracts to those who submit satisfactory information
concerning their financial status, plant and equipment, and prior experience.",
Second are the statutes which compel the submission of the same information,
but apply to private as well as public projects. 112 The third and most proliferous
kind of legislation provides for the licensing of various individual trades within
the construction industry and, typically, for supplemental examinations, bonds
and other elaborate preliminaries.
1" 3
Such a trustee cannot bind the trust by allowing unpaid claims to occasion the filing of
mechanics' liens. Allison & Ver Valen Co. v. McNee, 170 Misc. 144, 9 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Sup.
Ct. 1939). A lien filed under these circumstances would probably be held invalid on the
theory that the trustee was not a lienable owner under the mechanics' lien acts. See text
accompanying note 93 supra. This question is largely unlitigated. See Note, 19 BROoKLYN
L. REv. 287 (1953). In a few jurisdictions trust property has been specifically exempted
from vulnerability to mechanics' liens. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 22 (1930).
110. For an excellent discussion of the various licensing statutes, see Edwards, Legal
Requirements That Building Contractors Be Licensed, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 76
(1947).
The following states require licensing of general contractors undertaking any private
work within the state: Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
and Vermont. The following impose license requirements for work valued at a certain
minimum or above, the minimum figures ranging from $5,000 to $20,000: Alabama, Cali-
foruia, Maryland, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee and Utah. Arkansas and Vir-
ginia require licensing only if the project exceeds $20,000. BUREAU OF CONTRACT INFORMA-
TION, INC., SUMMARY OF STATE REGULATIONS AND TAXES AFFECTING GENERAL CON-
TRACTORS (1956). For statutes compelling the licensing of subcontractors, see note 113
infra.
111. For legislation governing state projects, see, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 8968-01,
-15 (1956); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:50-5 (1940) ; ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 279.010, .016 (1953) ;
PA. REV. STAT. tit. 71, § 642 (1942). Analogous municipal regulations are upheld only
when the prequalification of bidders system is administered objectively. See, e.g., Harris
v. City of Philadelphia, 299 Pa. 473, 149 Atl. 722 (1930) ; cf. Araneo-White Constr. Co.
v. Joint Municipal Sewer Comin'n, 9 N.J. Misc. 243, 154 Atl. 313 (Ch. 1931). According
to a 1.945 survey, most municipalties do not have a standard prequalification system.
RHYNE, MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS 69 (1952).
112. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit .46, § 66-82- (1940) ; ARIz. CODE ANN. § 67-2302 (Supp.
1952) ; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 7000-145 (1955); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 205.35 (1943);
NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 624.230-.320 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-601,-602 (1955).
113. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1111/, § 116.48 (Smith-Hurd 1954) (plumbers);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, §§ 179, 180 (1957) (plumbers, gas-fitters, etc.); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 87-10 (general contractors), § 87-22 (plumbers), § 87-34 (tile), § 87-44 (electrical
[Vol. 68:138
]MECHANICS' LIENS
Although licenses run for a limited number of years, renewal is practically
automatic in most instances, provided a fee is paid. The submission of current
data is rarely demanded. 11 4 But even were renewal contingent on up-to-date
information, the rapidity with which conditions change in the industry would
prevent licensing from ensuring the solvency of contractors. A license based
on an analysis of a contractor's financial position at a given time is no guarantee
that he will be able to complete even his immediate undertakings successfully.
To be effective, a licensing system would have to provide for a continual inquiry
into every contractor's commercial fortunes-an administratively unfeasible
task. It would be politically unfeasible as well, for state trade associations with
large, vested interests are, in the main, responsible both for the promulgation
and enforcement of the licensing acts.115 The screening of applicants is often
directed not at incompetence and financial instability but at firms desiring to
introduce new and efficient building techniques or simply to engage in vigorous
competition. Inherent difficulties of this sort, combined with the legislature's
disinterest, will continue to frustrate efforts looking to the adequate disclosure
of information.
Aside from the disclosure provisions, many licensing statutes further require
that every licensee deposit a surety bond with the licensing agency. Invariably
small, the amount of the bond frequently does not exceed $500 or $1,000.116
Licensees who have made such deposits commonly advertise themselves as
"bonded," and thus engage in a practice which has proved highly deceptive.
Owners purchasing a licensee's services are often unaware of the insignificance
of his bond, and assume a security which does not exist. Hence, bonding as an
adjunct of licensing might well be abolished-unless bonds reasonably large
in amount are required, or inadequately secured licensees are forbidden to hold
themselves out as "bonded."
BONDING
Almost unknown in the days when the first mechanics' lien statutes were
passed, the corporate surety has taken on an increasingly important role in
work) (1949); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-297,-303.1 (1955), § 58-299 (Supp. 1958) (elec-
tricians, plumbers, steam fitters; sellers of tombstones specifically excluded).
114. For renewal provisions, see, e.g., the statutory sections cited in note 113 supra.
115. An unusual statutory acknowledgement of the power of trade associations was
once found in ILL. ANN. STAT. § 103-13 (1944) (later amended), which directed that the Board
of Plumbing Examiners be chosen only after the recommendations of the Illinois Master
Plumbers' Association and the Illinois Association of Journeymen Plumbers and Steam
Fitters had been given "due consideration." At one time in North Carolina, every member
of the Tile Licensing Board was also a member of the Tile and Mantel Contractors Asso-
ciation of America. TIE & MANTEL CONTPAcTORs Ass'N, CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS 81
(1938). See generally Edwards, Legal Requirements That Building Cdntractors Be
Licensed, 12 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoD. 76 (1947).
116. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 32625-26 (1947).
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the building industry.1 1 7 In contrast with the limited objective of the lien
statutes-to allocate losses among the persons on whom they naturally fall-the
policy behind surety bonding is both to minimize losses and to distribute them
over the entire industry. Rather than allow unpaid claims to accumulate against
and endanger the project, bonding ensures the owner that no such claims will
arise and that the improvement will be finished on time and for the contract
price. This protection arises through two different and distinct kinds of bonds
which are usually furnished by the general contractor as principal.
The Performance Bond. The first type of bond guarantees that the contract
will be performed in accordance with its provisions." s Since most contracts
make the payment of subcontractors and suppliers a definite element of per-
formance, the bond's protection extends to lien claimants as well as to the
owner." 9 On a default by the general contractor, the owner may complete the
project himself and charge the surety with the difference between the final cost
and the contract price-within the limits of the surety's liability as set by the
penal sum of the bond.120 The bond often contains an additional provision
under which the surety may elect, with the owner's permission, to take over
the task of completion either personally or by reletting the job.121 So electing,
a surety may have the supplemental right to make use of the general contractor's
equipment and materials. Absent a default, the surety is usually authorized
117. See generally BACKMAN, SURETY RATE-MAKING 1 (1948).
According to figures furnished the Yale Law Journal by the Surety Association of
America, the premiums written (received) and losses incurred on surety bonds on con-
struction projects in recent years have been as follows.
CONTRACT BOND EXPERIENCE OF APPROXIMATELY FIFTY SURETY COMPANIES
1951-1956
Federal Contracts Nonfederal Contracts* Total Contracts
Premiums Losses Premiums Losses Premiums Losses
Written Incurred Written Incurred Written Incurred
1951 $ 21,124,877 $ 5,746,698 $ 60,674,219 $ 27,871,209 $ 81,799,906 $ 33,617,907
1952 21,431,462 5,369,537 64,559,579 21,058,049 85,991,041 26,427,586
1953 16,125,444 8,497,871 75,879,484 21,910,320 92,004,928 30,408,191
1954 14,381,336 9,505,795 81,576,837 22,180,022 95,958,173 31,685,817
1955 16,417,365 9,252,341 86,575,731 34,475,182 102,993,096 43,727,523
1956 16,303,032 10,275,393 91,327,971 44,004,936 107,631,003 54,280,329
Total $105,783,516 $48,647,635 $460,593,821 $171,499,718 $566,377,337 $220,147,353
*The Surety Association of America estimates that 75% of the nonfederal contract totals
represent state and local government projects; the remainder, private building.
118. See SuRETr Ass'N OF AMERICA, CONSTRUCTIoN-THE BONDED CONTRACT Is THE
OWNER'S PROTECTION 18 (1957).
119. See PARKER & ADAMS, THE A.I.A. STANDARD CONTRAcT FoRMs AND THE LAw
40 (1954).
120. This term refers to the sum fixed in the bond as the maximum of the surety's
liability. See, e.g., Cals', CORPORATE Sup~rvsmn 114 (1939).
121. See SuRETY Ass'N OF AMERICA, CONSTRUCTION-THE BONDED CONTRACT IS
THE OWNER'S PROTECTION 14 (1957).
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to inspect the general contractor's operations and to exercise various controls
designed to forestall financial difficulties and departures from the contract. A
collateral agreement may permit the surety to intervene and manage the project
through new supervisory personnel, should the general contractor encounter
difficulties with which he is unable to cope.' 22
When default occurs and the owner has been reimbursed, a secondary right
of action against the surety is sometimes allowed subcontractors and suppliers
under a third-party beneficiary theory. 2 3 As a practical matter, the principal
protection that these claimants derive from the performance bond is its assurance
that the project will not be discontinued because of the default of the general con-
tractor-and that they will therefore eventually be paid. Since a take-over by
the surety of a bonded owner normally follows a default more promptly than
does an unbonded owner's effort to complete a project, bonding tends to ensure
a greater continuity of employment to those subcontractors whose performance
warrants their retention.
The Paymnent Bond. The principal source to which the subcontractor will
look for immediate satisfaction is the payment bond-a specific guarantee of
reimbursement for all labor and materials. It usually gives the unpaid sub-
contractor or supplier a direct right of action against the surety and is custom-
arily in a sum approximating fifty per cent of the contract price.'2A Phrased
in terms sufficiently broad to eliminate practically any uncertainty over what
claims are covered, this type of bond avoids the litigious quibbling so common
under the lien statutes.
Bonding on Public Works
To date, both kinds of contract bonding have been utilized primarily in the
field of public works. 125 This development stems from the fact that, while
mechanics' liens may sometimes attach to the fund due on public works, 2 6
they may never attach to the public improvements themselves. 27 Recognizing
122. For a detailed discussion of what the surety may do to bail out a sinking general
contractor, see Mansfield & McCahan, Claims Under Contract Bonds, 21 INS. COUNsEL J.
265 (1954).
123. See Croker v. N.Y. Trust Co., 245 N.Y. 17, 156 N.E. 81 (1927); cf. Buffalo
Cement Co. v. McNaughton, 90 Hun. 74, 35 N.Y. Supp. 453 (Sup. Ct. 1895), af'd, 156 N.Y.
702, 51 N.E. 1089 (1898).
124. For sample form of bond, see SuRETY Ass'N OF A mmIcA, CoxsTavucno-THE
BONDED CONTRACT IS THE OWNER'S PRomcmoN 16 (1957).
125. See Gaffney, Suretyship for Construction, Casualty & Surety J., Nov. 1955, 1). 15.
In addition to taking out a payment and/or performance bond on being awarded a
contract, the general contractor is usually required to take out a bid-bond on submitting
his bid. This bond guarantees that, if selected, he will enter the contract. See, e.g., Palo
& Dodini v. City of Oakland, 79 Cal. App. 2d 739, 180 P.2d 764 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947);
RHYNE, MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS 53 (1952).
126. See, e.g., N.Y. LIEN LAw § 5; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :44-128 (1952) ; TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5472(a) (1948).
127. Neal-Millard Co. v. Trustees of Chatham Academy, 121 Ga. 208, 48 S.E. 978
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a responsibility to safeguard its subcontractors and suppliers,128 the federal
government requires, under the Miller Act, that general contractors supply
both performance and payment bonds on any contract worth over $2,000.12
The amount of the performance bond is not specifically set by the statute, but
is left to the governmental instrumentality letting the contract.130 On the other
hand, the limits of the payment bond are defined in the act as half the contract
price on projects costing less than $1,000,000, and slightly less than half for
larger projects. 1' 1 The right to sue on a payment bond is limited to those
contracting directly with the prime contractor or with his immediate subcon-
tractors or suppliers. Since the right of recovery is denied persons lower down
the contractual chain, the government often insists that the general contractor
require the subcontractors to bond themselves in turn.13 2 In this fashion, cover-
age is extended to virtually every potential claimant, and the available fund for
all claimants is increased.
The Miller Act's performance and payment bonds comprehend a variety
of claims which do not ordinarily give rise to statutory liens. 133 The average
bond is phrased in terms of discharging the "claims arising" on a project and,
unlike many of the lien statutes, does not enumerate the specific items and classes
of work which it covers. Since a bond's language usually embraces any claim
(1904); Knapp v. Swaney, 56 Mich. 345, 23 N.W. 162 (1885); School Dist. No. 27 v.
Graham, 45 Okla. 531, 146 Pac. 213 (1915) ; Annot., 26 A.L.R. 326 (1923).
The single exception to this rule is the state of Maine's special enactment of 1915, which
allows mechanics' liens to attach to public improvements and subjacent land. ME. REV.
STAT. ch. 178, § 34 (1954). Maine has no bonding regulations covering public works.
128. National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 724, 133 F. Supp. 381, cert. denied,
350 U.S. 902 (1955). See also Liebman v. United States ex rel. California Elec. Supply Co.,
153 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1946).
129. 49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. §§ 270(a)-(c) (1952). The Miller Act replaced
the Heard Act, 28 Stat. 279 (1894), which had proved insufficient to cope with increasingly
complex contract situations. See Stickells, Bonds of Contractors on Federal Public Works:
-The Miller. Act, 36 B.U.L. REv. 499 (1956); Cushman, Surety Bonds on Federal Con-
struction Contracts: Current Decisions Reviewed, 25 FORDEAm L. REv. 241, 242 (1956).
130. For example, performance bonds obtained on contracts let by the Army procure-
ment program must be in a penal sum of at least 50% of the contract price. If change orders
(modifications) in excess of $25,000 are entered, the penal sum must be raised. CREDIT
MANUAL OF COMSmERciAL LAws 571 (1957).
131. On contracts not over $5,000,000 but in excess of $1,000,000 the bond must
equal 40% of the price. On contracts exceeding $5,000,000, the bond must be in the sum
of $2,500,000. Certain departments of the federal government may waive the Miller Act
with respect to cost-plus, fixed-fee and similar contracts for public works. Miller Act,
49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270(a) (2) (1952).
132. Miller Act coverage has been specifically extended to labor and material suppliers
of the first degree. Basich Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States ex rel. Turner, 159 F.2d
182 (9th Cir. 1946) ; United States ex rel Harrington v. Trione, 97 F. Supp. 522 (D. Colo.
1951). Suppliers of the second degree, however, cannot recover on the payment bond.
Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin Tomkins Co., 322 U.S. 102 (1944).
133. Claims recoverable under the Miller Act are not limited to those ordinarily
giving rise to liens. See, e.g., Brogan v. National Sur. Co., 246 U.S. 257 (1918) ; cf. United




which is a reasonable consequence of work on the project in question, the me-
chanics'-lien confusion over what items are lienable is generally avoided.134
State and municipal improvements are also exempt from mechanics' liens. 135
Most states have, in one way or another, followed the pattern set by the federal
government, and require payment or performance bonds, or both.136 The same
persons who are protected by the terms of the Miller Act are normally covered
by the corresponding provisions of local regulations.137 A number of the states
have simply adopted the federal, two-bond system,138 but most require only a
single bond which provides both guarantees, more or less. 3 9 In contrast with
the separate payment bond, however, the composite bond prefers the owner
over subcontractors and suppliers. As a result, a claimant may be unable to
recover anything because the owner's charges have exhausted available funds.1
40
Some jurisdictions, including New York, require that each bond claimant
be eligible for a mechanic's lien, and compel claimants to go through the motions
of establishing in court their right to a lien before recovering against the
surety.' 41 This absurd procedure defeats the advantages of bonding, which
134. See, e.g., Glassell-Taylor Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 153 F.2d 527 (5th Cir.
1946) (construing Miller Act bond).
135. See cases cited note 127 supra.
136. CREDIT MANUAL OF COMMERCIAL LAWS 592-667 (1958). Only Kentucky, Maine
and South Carolina lack express surety bond legislation for public works. Their highway
departments nevertheless require labor and material bonds. Haas, The Corporate Surety
and Public Construction Bonds, 25 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 206, 207 n.5 (1957). States
requiring a bond in an amount not less than 50% of the contract price are: Alabama,
Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
and Wyoming. A bond of not less than 75% of the contract price is required in Delaware
and Iowa; 80% is the lower limit in New Hampshire. The bond must equal 100% of con-
tract price in: Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. Sliding scales similar to those of the
Miller Act control in California, Illinois, North Carolina, Tennessee and West Virginia.
The remaining states have no express statutory requirement, the sum of the bond being
determined at the discretion of the governmental body concerned.
Many municipalities have also adopted mandatory bonding requirements. RHYNE,
MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS 53-55 (1952).
137. A position contrary to that of the Miller Act with respect to the rights of first-
degree suppliers prevails in some states. E.g., Fosmire v. National Sur. Co., 229 N.Y. 44,
127 N.E. 472 (1920). See Note, 23 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 315 (1949). If the subcontractor
has himself obtained the bond, the supplier's rights may be different. Daniel-Morris Co.
v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 308 N.Y. 464, 126 N.E.2d 750 (1955).
138. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 50, § 16 (1940) ; CAL. GovT CODE §§ 4200-08 (1955);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7214 (1949) ; VT. STAT. § 4909 (1947) ; Wis. STAT. § 289.16 (1955).
139. CREDIT MANUAL OF COMMERCIAL LAWS 592-697 (1958).
140. See Van Clief & Sons v. City of New York, 141 Misc. 216, 252 N.Y. Supp. 402
(Sup. Ct. 1931) ; cf. Fosmire v. National Sur. Co., 229 N.Y. 44, 127 N.E. 472 (1920);
Buffalo Cement Co. v. McNaughton, 90 Hun. 74, 35 N.Y. Supp. 453 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
141. "In order to secure any rights and benefits conferred herein, laborers having
claims for unpaid wages . . . shall file and enforce a mechanics' lien pursuant to the pro-
visions of the lien law, and a materialman, in order to secure any such rights and benefits,
shall file and enforce a mechanics' lien pursuant to the provisions of the lien law." N.Y.
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largely arise from the elimination of the difficulties and ambiguities inherent in
lien actions. Making a bond-recovery action contingent on the proof of a valid,
hypothetical lien has nothing to recommend it and should be superseded by a
rule allowing direct recourse to the surety.
Bonding Private Projects
Proposals for the statutory extension of bonding to private construc-
tion received some measure of support in 1932, when a committee sponsored
by the United States Department of Commerce drafted the Uniform Mechanics'
Lien Act. The model statute would enable an owner to exempt his property
from liens if he had required that the general contractor obtain adequate bond-
ing.142 This provision is largely academic, for the act itself has been cordially
ignored. 143 A few states, however, have analogous legislation permitting owners
voluntarily to substitute bond protection for mechanics'-lien liability.
144
Although the efficacy of permissive statutes of this nature is difficult to gauge,
they probably afford little protection to the subcontractor or supplier. Their
flaw is basic. When initiated industry-wide, bonding serves to apply the cor-
porate sureties' investigation experience in such a way as to eliminate the bad
credit risk. But if the system is merely permissive, the contractor who is unable
to secure a bond will continue to operate under the lien law. Owners may,
of course, refuse to accept him without adequate bonding, but other economic
considerations, such as a significantly low bid, could induce an owner to forego
the protection of a bond. The natural optimism of many owners at the outset
of a project, and their tendency to minimize risks when faced with the added
expense of a bond,145 make unlikely their insistence on the guarantees of surety-
ship.1 46
STATE FIN. LAW § 137. The statute has been amended to provide that if a lien would be
invalid because of the insufficiency of the "amount due," the claimant may still recover
from the surety if the lien be otherwise valid. N.Y. STAT. Fix. LAw § 137 (Supp. 1958).
For general background, see N.Y. LAW RmrvsioN CoMM., 1945 REPORT, RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND STUDIES 579 (1945).
142. UNIFORM MECdANics' LIEN Acr § 7 (1932).
143. See Imlay, Problems in Uniform Mechanics' Lien Act, 19 A.B.A.J. 116 (1933)
(written by the chairman of the Mechanics' Lien Act Committee, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) ; Legislation, 19 VA. L. RE v. 406 (1933). For draft
legislation proposed, see Comment, Sixth Tentative Draft of a Uniform Meclhanics' Lien
Statute, 41 YALE L.J. 271 (1931) ; Cushman, The Proposed Uniform Mechanics' Lien Law,
80 U. PA. L. REv. 1083, 1086, 1088 (1932).
144. The Uniform Mechanics' Lien Act was adopted, in substance, by one state.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 84.01-.35 (1943). A few other states have variants of § 7 of the uniform
act. See, e.g., CAI. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1181-96.1 (1955); N.Y. LIEN LAW § 37.
145. The general rates on contract bonds have been reduced by some 25 to 33y3% from
1936 to 1948. See BACKMAN, SuRETY RATE-MAKING 302 (1948). Since then, total premium
costs have been reduced still further. A general maximum rate of 1% prevailed until
1955 for a 24-month bond, with the usual rate being $7.50 per $1,000 for contracts less than
$2,500,000. The present rates are $10 per $1,000 for the first $100,000, $6.50 per $1,000
for the next $2,400,000 and so on down to $4.70 per $1,000 for any amount in exce: of
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Some private work is being bonded, however, thanks to the responsible
exercise of independent judgment. The bulk of such bonding appears to cover
comparatively large building projects-which are commonly undertaken by
reputable, responsible and heavily capitalized organizations. Thus, from the
subcontractor's point of view, private bonding prevails where protection is
least needed. It is the seventy per cent of general contractors who are small
operators, those with three or fewer employees in their offices, who pose the
major threat to the unwary.147
When guaranteed by a surety, private construction normally is covered by
both performance and payment bonds. The dual-bond arrangement provides
owner, subcontractor and supplier with a measure of protection not available
under the lien system. A general contractor who obtains a bond has, in effect,
met qualification standards which reflect both the surety's experience in judging
underwriting risks and his records relating to the past performance of con-
tractors. Although a surety may occasionally seek to increase his business by
underwriting risks refused elsewhere, frequent recourse to this practice has,
in the past, invariably led to the surety's insolvency. In brief, since sureties
are unlikely to bond a contractor on a job for which he is not equipped, potential
defaults can be avoided and small contractors can be restricted to projects which
do not overextend their limited capital. If a general contractor is unable to
take on a given project alone, the surety may refuse to bond him until he joins
forces with another contractor. The surety may even take an active part in
the formation of such joint ventures, which not only consolidate resources
but also increase the number of responsible bidders. 148 Of course, by successful
performance a small contractor can increase his capital to the point where, by
himself, he is able to secure bonding for the larger projects previously closed
to him.
The presence of the surety tends to shorten the interval between the sub-
mission and acceptance of a bid, since the qualifications of a bonded low bidder
do not require extensive re-examination. The flow of materials is also ex-
$7,500,000. Thus, a 24-month bond for a $2,500,000 contract, which would have cost $18,750
at the pre-1955 rate, now costs $16,600. SuRETY Ass'N oF AmERICA, RATE MANUAL OF
FIDiLITY, FORGERY AND SUR=T' BoNDs, temporary page C-9 (July 20, 1955). This compares
with a rise in material prices in the construction industry of 172% since 1939, a rise of
152% in construction machinery prices and a rise of 243% in common labor wages. See
Engineering News Record, Feb. 13, 1958.
146. Furthermore, under the laws of 26 jurisdictions an owner has little incentive
to take out a bond initially, since he can replace a lien, once it attaches, with a bond or other
security or undertaking. The jurisdictions are: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, District
of Columbia, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming.
147. For the prevalence of small contractors, see Haas, The Corporate Surety and
Pubc Construction Bonds, 25 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 206, 207 (1957).
148. Cushman, Surety Bonds on Federal Constructio Contracts: Current Decisiony
Revzewed, 25 FORDHAm L. REv. 241, 253 (1956).
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pedited, because fears of poor credit risks need not inhibit materialmen. In
fact, the added protection of bonding serves to induce more bids, so that com-
petition among subcontractors and suppliers is increased. Furthermore, their
bids will reflect the prospect of prompt reimbursement and hence will not in-
corporate loading charges to cover the hazard of nonpayment.149 The conse-
quent reduction in construction costs could offset the expense added by bond
premiums.
CONCLUSION
In almost every respect, the statutory mechanic's lien provides protection
inferior to that afforded the owner, the general contractor, the subcontractor
and the supplier by an adequately arranged bonding system1 0 Comparatively
speaking, the presence of the corporate surety reduces both the size of the
ultimate loss and its incidence on any individual party. The frequent impru-
dence or shortsightedness of owners nonetheless renders the mere availability
of bonding insufficient to ensure its use in a uniform and consistent manner.
A need for statutory compulsion of some sort is definitely indicated. Bonding
should either be mandatory, or the owner's liability under existing lien law
should be so increased as to leave him no practical alternative but to require the
bonding of his general contractor.
The better solution would be to make bonding a prerequisite to engaging
in private construction activities of any significance. State legislation to this
end could be patterned after the provisions of the Miller Act, although the
minimum value of a contract which would invoke such a statute might well
be raised from the Miller Act figure of $2,000 to at least $10,000. Contracts
worth less than $10,000 generally are performed within a relatively short period,
with payment made in one lump sum rather than in installments. And, ob-
viously, $2,000 no longer represents a project of the size that it did when the
act was passed in 1935. Moreover, the present lien laws could be retained to
provide remedies on projects which involve less than the statute's minimum
contract price.
Any statute making surety arrangements mandatory should set forth a
model bond whose terms would automatically meet the law's requirements.
As in the Miller Act, a schedule of minimum bonding sums for corresponding
contract prices should also be included.' 0 ' To protect the surety, such legisla-
tion should avoid the loopholes in present bonding acts. They permit a con-
tractor or supplier who has been lax in pursuing his claim to reactivate the
statutory period for notifying the surety by performing a token service long
149. See ibid.
150. See BROOKE, OTHER PEOPLE'S LABOR AND MATERIAL IN THE BUILDING INDUSTRY
OF GREATER NEW YORK (1933) (entries of 33,117 recorded liens covering private improve-
ments studied over a six-year period; during every year at least half of the recorded
liens were left unsatisfied).
151. For the Miller Act schedule, see 49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270(a) (1952).
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after completion of the work giving rise to the claim.152 Enforcing strict compli-
ance with the period for filing claims should work no hardships, especially if
future statutes require the surety to inform all subcontractors and suppliers of
the time limits on their rights.
Preferably, the general contractor's payment bonds should cover all subcon-
tractors and immediate suppliers. If, however, coverage is restricted, subcon-
tractors should be compelled to obtain surety protection against the claims of
those not within the scope of the primary bond. In addition, a contractor or
owner who deliberately or negligently fails to meet the requirements of the statute
might be held personally liable to any injured claimant.
A statute imposing mandatory bonding, though an inhibition on freedom
of contract, would undoubtedly be constitutional. 153 State legislatures may
nevertheless find a law of this sort too radical a departure from their current
mechanics' lien provisions.15r In this event, another, though less desirable,
legislative route is available.
152. See, e.g., United States for use and benefit of General Elec. Supply Corp. v.
Hershson, 52 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); cf. In re Abbot-Gamble Co., 195 Fed. 465
(2d Cir. 1912) ; Nelson v. Schrank, 273 App. Div. 72, 75 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1947).
153. While U.S. CoNsT. art. 10, § 10 has been read as a general prohibition against
interference with the right to contract, the seriousness with which this prohibition is re-
garded has diminished greatly since the days of Mr. justice Peckham. Ultimately, the
question is one of whether or not the state's economic interests justify the exercise of the
police power notwithstanding the interference with contract that may occur. See, e.g.,
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). The same argument is at the
root of any attack based on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. People
v. Levitt, 145 Misc. 621, 260 N.Y. Supp. 458 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 1932).
State regulation of the construction industry has been sustained on analogous questions.
The trust fund provisions in New York, N.Y. LiEN LAw § 36 (Supp. 1958), were
challenged on constitutional grounds; the statute was sustained in the following language:
The evils which infested the building industry are well known to all. It is common
knowledge that "shoestring" builders, contractors and subcontractors frequently en-
gaged in building enterprises with little or no capital; that contracts were made by
them for material and labor; that payments subsequently received by such builders
. . . were frequently not applied to the payment of such material and labor, but
instead were diverted from their proper purpose, leaving to the victims only the
remedy of a mechanic's lien without the security of a fund out of which it could be
satisfied.
It is easily seen how such transactions are affected with a public interest. Losses
incurred must be absorbed by the general public. This results in higher construction
costs and therefore in higher rents. The cost of construction is eventually paid
by the public ....
People v. Levitt, supra at 622-23, 260 N.Y. Supp. at 460.
154. An example of the pressure to which legislatures will be subjected is found
in the experience of interested citizens who attempted in 1946 to secure revision of N.Y.
STATE FIN. LAw § 137, which links recovery on a surety bond given on a public contract
with the proof of a valid mechanic's lien. Reportedly, the proposed change would have
been enacted but for the objection of a person in the state department in charge of
mechanics' liens whose job would have been eliminated.
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A modification of the Pennsylvania or direct-lien system could achieve ap-
proximately the same results as a mandatory bonding statute. On the assump-
tion that the general contractor is essentially the owner's agent for procuring
the labor and materials used on a project, the owner's property could be sub-
jected to all subcontractors' and suppliers' liens without limitation. Hence,
the contract price would have no effect on the owner's total liability, and statu-
tory provisions immunizing the owner from any contractual claims until all
work is done could be repealed as needlessly restrictive, for the owner would
no longer be able to limit his total lien and contract payments to the contract
price. In addition, waivers of lien rights and owners' disclaimers would of
necessity have to be disallowed. Finally, the owner should become personally
liable for all lien claims not satisfied by foreclosure on the property in question.' '
In the case of corporate owners whose assets are limited to the project under
construction, imposing personal liability on the directors may also be necessary.
If the general contract was let by one not the owner of the fee, liability should
be imposed on the contracting, apparent owner.
Incorporating the foregoing provisions into direct-lien statutes would make
it virtually essential that every owner require his general contractor to procure
a bond. The liability imposed by the revised lien law would probably dictate
the form and amount of the bond. Astute statutory draftsmanship could force
the owner to demand bonding which would protect all claimants however far
removed, or to demand that the general contractor impose surety arrangements
on his subcontractors, as occurs under the Miller Act. 50
Mandatory bonding, whether imposed directly by statutory prescription or
indirectly through the owner's unlimited mechanics'-lien liability, may appear
at first a drastic proposal. Patching up existing lien acts is, however, an un-
satisfactory alternative. Admittedly, the classes of persons entitled to lien and
155. Personal liability as a result of failure to bond has already been imposed in a few
jurisdictions, and the constitutionality of such provisions upheld. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-1,
14-2-2 (1953), Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 Pac. 241 (1917) ; LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9.4802-.4806 (1950), Arcadia Lumber Co. v. Austin, 15 La. App. 212,
131 So. 601 (1930), Utley Paint Co. v. Foster, 1 La. App. 27 (1924) ; cf. Standard Acc.
Ins. Co. v. Bear, 134 Fla. 523, 184 So. 97 (1938).
The Utah statute requires that the owner of any project over $500 in value obtain a
bond in the amount of the contract price, conditioned on both performance and the pay-
ment of those who supply labor and materials to the improvement. Failure to obtain the
bond renders the owner personally liable to all such persons. A similar statute is now under
consideration in Colorado. See Colo. Reg. Sess. 1957, S.B. 230 (for the form in which
the latest proposal, rather emasculated, has reached the legislature). The Utah personal
liability provision has been opposed in Colorado on the ground that, by eliminating the
security of the improvement, it unwisely exposes subcontractors to the difficulties of col-
lecting in a purely personal action. Letters in the files of The Surety Association of
America. This objection is founded on a misunderstanding. The Utah code still pro-
vides for mechanics' liens, UTAH CoDE ANN. § 38-1-3 (1953), and §§ 14-2-1 and 14-2-2
have been specifically held to be supplementary to the mechanic's lien, not replacements
of it. Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, sutpra.
156. See text at note 132 mtrpra.
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the types of lienable claims could be enlarged, but fundamental shortcomings
would remain. The lien system presupposes the existence of construction losses
and merely provides a method of allocating them among the parties immedi-
ately involved. Absent a surety, it is only at the direct expense of the owner
that lien protection can be extended for subcontractors and suppliers; and
restricting lien protection obviously leaves them to their own devices amidst
the manifold hazards of a highly speculative industry. Bonding alone accords
subcontractors and suppliers maximum security without subjecting owners
to a crushing burden of potential liability. Losses sustained on a bonded project
are borne initially by all the general contractors who pay premiums to the surety
companies. Moreover, where bonding is conventional, premiums constitute a
construction expense which is reflected in every contractor's bid. The owner
who accepts a bid may be expected to pass the premium costs on to the ultimate
users of the particular project. Thus, the price of added stability in the con-
struction industry will actually be paid by those who ultimately benefit.
